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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the internationalization of securities markets has
accelerated in pace and broadened in scope, due in part to advances in
telecommunications and computer technology. A growing number of stocks
are listed on several national markets, and a larger set of securities listed on
a single market are nonetheless accessible to foreign traders.' Other aspects
of securities trading have acquired international dimensions too: securities
firms now operate in foreign countries as traders and investment advisers,
and computerized stock exchanges in different nations are interconnected
with data links. An example will convey the complexity of this trend:
measured by foreign assets, Royal Dutch/Shell is the world's largest
nonfinancial multinational corporation (has the largest percentage of foreign
assets among nonfinancial multinational corporations).' It grew out of a 1907
alliance between Royal Dutch and Shell, by which the two companies
merged their interests while remaining distinct entities incorporated in the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.3 Royal Dutch and Shell are listed on
nine stock exchanges in Europe and in the United States, and can be traded
locally in each market. The integrated firm is thus subject to two different
regimes of corporate law (Dutch and English) and to nine potentially
different regimes of securities regulation. Consequently, investors could
theoretically have up to eighteen different ways to invest in the same
enterprise.
Firms like Royal Dutch/Shell pose formidable difficulties to domestic
securities regulation systems. Intuitively, one could expect cooperation
among all the relevant regulation authorities to emerge. But in an
increasingly globalized capital market where stock exchanges vie for foreign
listings and trading volume, regulators may sometimes find it hard to
cooperate. On the one hand, cooperation may enhance the effectiveness of
their regulatory regime; on the other hand, certain forms of regulatory
cooperation could adversely affect a market that tries to acquire a
1. For recent statistics on foreign listed stocks, see Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage
for Real: International Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J.
INT'L L. 563, 566 (1998).
2. See UNITED NATIONS, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 1996: INVESTMENT, TRAD3 AND
INTERNATIONAL POLICY ARRANGEMENTS tbl.3 (1996).
3. See Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, 20-F filing for 1994, at 1-4, available in LEXIS,
Fedsec Library, 20-F File.
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competitive edge by distinguishing itself from others. This Article looks
behind this intuition and systematically assesses the prospects for such
cooperation.
The internationalization of securities markets bears directly on
American firms and individuals. Foreign markets may offer higher prices
for firms' stocks, thus lowering their cost of capital. For these firms,
securities regulation that makes it more difficult to access these markets
could be a burden. For investors, foreign markets may open new
opportunities to diversify their portfolios. At the same time, securities
regulation is usually looked upon as a source of investor protection. It is thus
not surprising that a growing number of commentators are voicing concerns
about the possible adverse effects of the trend towards internationalization,
and are calling for more cooperation among nations in securities regulation.4
National securities regulators have also recognized the need for greater
cooperation, and a variety of efforts to achieve international cooperation in
securities regulation are currently under way. The boldest of these efforts is
the ongoing process of integration within the European Union (EU). This
effort has already achieved impressive results in harmonizing, inter alia,
disclosure rules and certain transaction rules.' A somewhat similar initiative
was undertaken in the United States and three Canadian provinces with the
establishment of the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS). Under
MJDS, disclosure statements of corporations of each jurisdiction are
recognized in the others.6 The most ambitious effort for international
cooperation is embodied in the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO), which provides the major international forum for
mutual consultation and collaboration among national regulators about
regulatory issues.7
Enforcement of regulatory measures has proven particularly difficult
with the internationalization of securities markets. Harmonized laws that are
not enforced with the same vigor in different countries are less transparent to
market participants than unharmonized, manifestly different laws and thus
may even be less effective than the unharmonized regime. Being fully aware
of this point, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
has accompanied its efforts to persuade foreign commissions to harmonize
their laws with those of the United States with an ongoing effort to tighten
the international enforcement of such laws. Thus, the SEC has been
striving-with considerable success so far-to form administrative
4. See infra Section II.B.
5. See infra text accompanying note 97.
6. See infra text accompanying note 125.
7. See infra text accompanying note 109.
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connections with foreign regulators, mainly through the use of memoranda
of understanding (MOUs). In recent years, this trend has broadened in scope
with the involvement of IOSCO.
The picture portrayed so far may be misleading in the harmonious
impression it gives. The cooperative efforts discussed above are the
exception to the rule, while the general situation is one characterized by
fierce competition and lack of cooperation. This international competition
takes place on at least two levels. First, countries compete for inflows of
investment capital. This holds true with regard to developed countries, and it
is even truer with regard to emerging economies around the globe. While in
the past capital inflows to emerging economies usually took the form of
foreign direct investment in subsidiaries' equity and similar ventures, it is
now commonplace to find growing stock exchanges in such countries, with
an increasing number of firms listing their securities on them. Second, the
business of securities trading is in itself profitable, so countries, and stock
exchanges in particular, vie for order flow and the consequent commissions
and financial activity. As a result, countries and stock exchanges might find
it in their interest not to cooperate with their counterparts if they believe that
noncooperation-or worse yet, cheating on or withdrawing from an existing
agreement-is preferable. Should a country discover that its securities
regulation laws are relatively more burdensome to foreign issuers, or even to
its domestic issuers (thereby driving them to raise capital abroad), it will be
tempted to lower its standards in order to accommodate the demands of
potential issuers. That such a reaction can initiate a regulatory competition in
the form of a "race to the bottom" is a well-known argument.8
Securities regulators thus face two problems in the international
context. The first is the fundamental incentive not to cooperate with their
colleagues to the extent that such cooperation might undermine their
country's competitive position in the international markets. The second
problem, seemingly inseparable from the first, is that adhering to the
competitive dynamics may, in fact, operate to the detriment of their
country's interests. The perceptive reader who recognizes the familiar
8. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Internationalization of the World's Securities Markets: Causes
and Regulatory Consequences, 1990 J. FIN. SERV. REs. 349; Joel P. Trachtman, International
Regulatory Competition, Externalization, and Jurisdiction, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47 (1993); cf. David
Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American
Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423
(1991) (discussing rules of incorporation in EC member states). The phrase "a race to the bottom," in
the sense of a legislative trend toward the lowest common denominator, has been coined in the context
of state competition for corporate charters in the United States. For representative samples of the
growing literature on this subject, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 212-27 (1991); ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF
AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 14-24 (1993); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The
Desirable Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435 (1992); and
William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974).
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pattern of the Prisoners' Dilemma9 is not entirely mistaken. However, while
the Prisoners' Dilemma proves to be a powerful heuristic model of
numerous real-life situations, it is by no means the only one.
In this Article I suggest a new, broader perspective for looking at
international securities regulation. I argue that in analyzing international
securities regulation, the Prisoners' Dilemma is a useful paradigm in only a
few of the problems that arise in practice. In many others, other 2x2 game
models better depict the conflictual situation that countries face and help to
assess the prospects of international cooperation in these situations. This
Article thus takes a critical approach towards some of the current analyses
and argues for a more fine-grained analysis. Securities regulation is not
monolithic, and different issues warrant different treatments when
international cooperation is considered. Unlike most of the existing
scholarship, this Article does not concentrate on unilateral regulatory
measures. Rather, the emphasis here is on regulatory cooperation-on the
problems securities regulators face in reaching sustainable agreement and on
the international regimes that may facilitate cooperation. In doing so, this
Article does not reject the usefulness of unilateral approaches intended to
devise better rules for conflict of laws; such rules may, indeed, lower
unnecessary friction between national regulators."0 However, to the extent
that unilateral approaches (particularly those that call for unabated regulatory
competition)" are championed as a sole solution, this Article shows how
they can be misguided. 2
This Article offers a unique integration of insights coming from three
different sources: theories of corporate governance and securities regulation,
standard game theory modeling, and international relations and regime
theory analysis. It applies, in a novel way, some well-known game theory
models to the field of international securities regulation. Game models of
varying complexity are commonplace in analyses of international economic
problems, yet international securities regulation has so far been dealt with
9. In a Prisoners' Dilemma situation the players face a dilemma: whether to cooperate or
defect. If both cooperate, both receive a medium size payoff (say, 3). If both defect, both receive a
lower payoff than in mutual cooperation (say, 2). If only one defects while the rival cooperates, the
defecting player receives the highest payoff (say, 4) and her rival, the unilaterally-cooperating
.sucker," receives the lowest payoff (say, 1). Given such a payoff structure, each player has an
incentive to defect irrespective of what she expects the other to do. See generally sources cited infra
note 46 (providing insights into the theory and application of the Prisoners' Dilemma).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 21-23.
11. See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
12. This Article is not a direct response to such views. It makes clear, however, that
cooperation may be needed in certain contexts of securities regulation in order to ensure that
competition does not lead to inefficient or otherwise unwanted results, and it further discusses the
institutional framework for such cooperation.
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either under traditional conventions of international law or in a law and
economics tradition by scholars who have often turned to finance theory.
There is virtually no scholarship attempting to pass the issues discussed here
through the prism of game theory-particularly not the strand of the game
theoretic literature that has developed in international relations theory. This
Article does so while paying attention to the corporate governance and
capital market aspects of securities regulation problems. As an important
aside, the Article aims to strengthen the budding interdisciplinary approach
to international relations and international legal problems; instead of offering
abstract principled arguments for such an approach, this Article
demonstrates its usefulness in a concrete legal and economic context.
Following this Introduction, Part H reviews the current analyses of
international securities regulation from a positive and normative perspective.
Part I lays the basis for modeling international securities regulation. First,
it analyzes some proposals for international securities regulation. It then
argues that game theoretic models that are used in international relations
analysis are especially suitable in the present context and discusses their
underlying methodology and assumptions. Part IV puts forward 2x2 game
models of three fundamental issue areas of international securities
regulation: disclosure regulation (with special attention to accounting
standards), antifraud regulation, and insider trading regulation. With respect
to each issue, this Article discusses possible sources of international
diversity, the economic problem underlying such diversity, and then the
prospects for international cooperation and some ways to facilitate it. Part V
concludes with a short agenda for further research.
II. CURRENT ANALYSES OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION
This Part provides a brief background on the legal doctrines applied to
questions of international securities regulation and various reform proposals.
It ends with some scenarios of possible future developments in international
securities regulation. Together, these two discussions emphasize the need for
a better theory of regulatory interaction in this field, which the remainder of
this Article seeks to provide.
A. The Traditional Legal Approach
Currently, the predominant doctrinal approach to international aspects
of securities regulation in the United States is clearly unilateral. The
hallmark of this unilateral approach is the extraterritorial application of
American laws to foreign issues, whether they involve foreign companies,
foreign transactors, or any other foreign element. In fact, under certain
precedents, the American character of a case at bar may be quite tenuous
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and yet be sufficient for an American court to both assert jurisdiction over it
and apply American laws to it.
In a nutshell, U.S. law provides a twofold exception to the general
presumption against extraterritorial application of national law. 13 One prong
is the "conduct test" which provides for extraterritoriality if prohibited
conduct in connection with a securities transaction occurred in the United
States, provided that the acts occurring domestically were not merely
preparatory, but rather an essential part of the misconduct. 14 The second
prong is the more controversial "effects test," under which adverse effects
on domestic securities markets from improper foreign transactions in
American securities suffice as a basis for jurisdiction. 5
B. Calls for Cooperation
A number of trends have rendered unilateral regulation through, inter
alia, assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction, more difficult to implement.
First, American stock markets have faced growing competition from other
stock exchanges where issuers and traders enjoyed more lax requirements
than the American ones. Thus, requiring foreign issuers to fully comply with
American laws has caused some issuers to stay away from American
markets, 6 and consequently to deny American investors the benefits of
international diversification of their portfolios. 7 In addition, in order to
implement such extraterritorial regulatory measures American regulators
increasingly found it necessary to obtain foreign-based information or
documents-something that required assistance from their foreign
counterparts. '
The outcome of these trends is reflected in the growing number of
commentators who call for more international cooperation in various forms
and degrees. The lowest level of cooperation is, in fact, at the unilateral
13. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
402 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
14. See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1337 (2d Cir.
1972).
15. See Schoenbaurn v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968). For a detailed
discussion, see JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ch. 18 (4th
ed. 1991); Michael D. Mann et al., Oversight by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission of
U.S. Markets and Issues of Internationalization and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 29 INT'L LAW. 731
(1995).
16. See infra note 85.
17. See SEC, INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, REPORT OF THE STAFF
OF THE U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS ch. 7 (1987) [hereinafter SEC, INTERNATIONALIZATION].
18. See Michael D. Mann et al., Developments in International Securities Law Enforcement
and Regulation, 29 INT'L LAW. 729, 730 (1995).
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level; it occurs when national regulators come to acknowledge the regulatory
sovereignty of other countries. At this level, some have advocated-as a
minimum-for more restraint in the extraterritorial application of American
law. 9 Such an approach echoes traditional public international law, which
looks at comity among nations, reasonableness of measures, accommodating
expectations, and balancing tests in general in order to reconcile conflicting
national interests and sovereignties. In this vein, the SEC has promulgated
several administrative measures with considerable exemptions from
regulatory requirements for foreign-related transactions.20
Still at the unilateral level, there is significant scholarship that attempts
to explain the problems of international securities regulation and that
propose optimal rules for them. Some writers" seek to design desirable
choice-of-law rules for extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws to
foreign corporations and transactors. They define a decision parameter for
U.S. legislators and enforcers that, in essence, looks at the national
character of the company.22 They further recommend that each country-and
19. See generally Roberta S. Karmel, The Second Circuit Role in Epanding the SEC's
Jurisdiction Abroad, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 743 (1991) (arguing that greater potential for conflict
between U.S. securities law and foreign securities laws requires greater concern for comity); Note,
Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L.
Rnv. 1310 (1985) (arguing that the consequence of aggressive and inconsistent extraterritorial reach
by U.S. courts has strained foreign relations with U.S. trading partners).
20. Such measures include exemptions with regard to foreign public offerings to U.S.
investors, U.S. trading in foreign securities, and foreign transactions in U.S. securities. See James L.
Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms Appropriate?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. S58; Roberta S. Karmel, Living with U.S. Regulations: Complying with the Rules and Avoiding
Litigation, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S152 (1994). See generally Michael D. Mann et al., New
Approaches to Securities Regulation, 29 ITrr'L LAW. 839 (1995) (listing new administrative measures).
21. See Merritt B. Fox, Insider Trading in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate
What?, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (1992) [hereinafter Fox, Insider Trading]; Merritt B. Fox,
Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom, 95 MICH. L. Rav. 2498
(1997); Donald C. Langevoort, Fraud and Insider Trading in American Securities Regulation: Its
Scope and Philosophy in a Global Marketplace, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 175 (1993)
[hereinafter Langevoort, Fraud and Insider Trading]; see also Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum
Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud Protection in an Internationalized Securities Marketplace,
55 LAw & CONTEMP. PIons. 241 (1992) (arguing that the prevailing extraterritoriality doctrine has
become useless and problematic, and that a more radical posture of restraints is required).
22. Merritt Fox seeks to maximize global economic welfare. See Fox, Insider Trading,
supra note 21. To solve the problem of decentralized decision-making, he uses a notion of a
company's "nationality," determined by the residency of the largest portion of its shareholders. See
id. For a similar attitude, see Bebehuk, supra note 8, at 1508. However, Fox candidly acknowledges
that when "genuine" multinational corporations (MNCs) are at issue, this rule will become
unworkable. See Fox, Insider Trading, supra note 21, at 302; cf. Joel P. Trachtman, Externalities and
Extraterritoriality: The Law and Economics of Prescriptive Jurisdiction 12 (May 1995) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the author, presented at a conference on the Economic Analysis of
International Law at the George Mason University School of Law, Law & Economics Center) ("A
transnational corporation.., presents special problems of prescriptive jurisdiction, simply because of
its artificial personality, and malleable nationality.").
Somewhat less rigorously, Langevoort uses a notion he terms "the source" as the decision
parameter, which apparently refers to the country of incorporation and its laws. Langevoort, Fraud
and Insider Trading, supra note 21, at 186. Langevoort would still allow the use of the effects test to
regulate foreign companies in certain egregious cases, where implicit regulatory conflicts are unlikely.
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specifically the United States-should apply and enforce its securities laws
on its companies, defined according to the mentioned parameters, and
refrain from such enforcement with respect to "foreign" ones except,
perhaps, in egregious cases. It is noteworthy that by taking a unilateral
approach these scholars tackle the cooperation problem by eschewing it
altogether. Other writers go even further and idealize unilateral regulation
by advocating international competition in securities regulation such that an
issuer would be able to opt into a particular national regime irrespective of
the issuer's country of origin.23
More significant, however, are the numerous calls for multilateral
agreements that would coordinate regulatory efforts made by different
countries. In a celebrated policy statement, the SEC announced that it would
prefer cooperative measures to unilateral ones. Senior SEC staff members
have voiced opinions in the same vein. 5 Maximum coordination would be
achieved through full harmonization (unification) of securities laws. This
would eliminate the differences that now cause tensions and friction. Various
See id.
23. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Lmvs, International Money:
Securities Regulation in Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1855, 1894 (1997); Stephen J.
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities
Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming July 1998); see also Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T.
Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus.
207 (1996) (advocating jurisdiction rules strictly limiting the application of U.S. laws and providing
means to opt-out of the domestic regulatory system). For a pointed critique, see Roberta Romano,
Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 2359, 2362
(1998) (advocating a market-oriented approach of competitive federalism for securities regulation in
which only the sovereign chosen by the issuer would have jurisdiction over its securities).
24. Regulation of International Securities Markets-Policy Statement of the U.S. Securities
and Exchange Commission, Securities Act Release No. 33,6807, [1988-89 transfer binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 84,341, at 89,576 (Nov. 14, 1988) [hereinafter SEC, Policy Statement]. For a
discussion of this important document, see Paul G. Mahoney, Securities Regulation by Enforcement:
An International Perspective, 7 YALE J. ON RFG. 305, 310-20 (1990).
The SEC's position reflected a diametrical shift from its previous regulatory policy which
championed unilateralism and non-compromising extraterritorial application of American law. The
SEC, however, found this policy increasingly difficult and politically costly to implement in the face
of foreign regulators' objections. See Mann et al., supra note 18.
25. See James R. Doty, The Role of the SEC in an Internationalized Marketplace, 60
FORDHAM L. REV. S77, S83 (1992) (the author was, at the time of publication, the General Counsel
to the SEC); Simon M. Lome, Current Trends in International Securities Regulation, 28 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 453, 453 (1995) (the author was, at the time, General Counsel to the SEC); Michael D.
Mann et al., The Establishment of International Mechanisms for Enforcing Provisional Orders and
Final Judgments Arising from Securities Law Violations, 55 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 303, 330
(1992) (calling for cooperation in enforcement) (the authors were, at the time of publication, Director
and staff members of the SEC's Office of International Affairs) [hereinafter Mann et al., International
Mechanisms]; Michael D. Mann et al., International Agreements and Understandings for the
Production of Information and Other Mutual Assistance, 29 INT'L LAW. 780, 823 (1995) (the authors
were, at the time of publication, Director and staff members of the SEC's Office of International
Affairs) [hereinafter Mann et al., International Agreements].
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arguments in this spirit have been made by scholars who hold that states in
general, and regulators in particular, should enhance cooperation and assist
their fellow regulators. To justify greater regulatory uniformity
commentators usually invoke both the "race to the bottom" as a likely
outcome of international competition where managerial opportunism is
involved as well as the need to save on compliance costs. Commentators
differ, however, with regard to the nature and degree of harmonization they
advocate.26
C. Future Scenarios
In 1990, the Office of Technology Assessment of the U.S. Congress
sketched three possible scenarios for international securities markets and
their regulation." The first assumes a gradual and orderly transition in
which international securities trading expands through gradual evolution,
without any major economic or political disruptions or global market
crashes. International regulation under this scenario was predicted to develop
slowly into an effective international regulatory structure, relying mainly on
IOSCO as an effective permanent organ for setting the agenda for
agreements and preparatory steps. More principal issues were said to take
more time to be resolved. This scenario was said to be "highly likely" and
"the probable one for global securities markets. "21
26. See James D. Cox, Regulatory Competition in Securities Markets: An Approach for
Reconciling Japanese and United States Disclosure Philosophies, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 149, 156-59 (1993) [hereinafter Cox, Regulatory Competition]; James D. Cox, Rethinking US
Securities Laws in the Shadow of International Regulatory Competition, 55 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.
157, 158 (1992) [hereinafter Cox, Rethinking US Securities]. However, in order to ensure the
American market's competitiveness, Cox calls for relaxing certain disclosure requirements that now
pertain only to American companies. See Cox, Rethinking US Securities, supra, at 170; see also
David Charny, Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American
Perspective on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities, 32 HARv. INT'L L.J. 423
(1991) (advocating a minimum standards regime to curb a race to the bottom); Uri Geiger, The Case
for the Harmonization of Securities Disclosure Rules in the Global Market, 1997 COLUM. BUs. L.
REv. 241 (advocating a uniform regime); Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Insider Trading in a Global
Marketplace: A Uniform Statutory Approach, 66 TUL. L. REv. 837 (1992) (advocating a uniform
regime); Manning Gilbert Warren I, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements of
the European Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185 (1990) (providing an overview of the European
mutual recognition regime). For a critical discussion of harmonization of securities regulation
regimes, see Amir N. Licht, International Diversity in Securities Regulation: Roadblocks on the Way
to Convergence, 20 CARDOZO L. REv. 227 (1998).
27. See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, TRADING AROUND THE CLOCK: GLOBAL SECURITIES
MARKETS AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 5-18 (1990).
28. Id. at 7-8. In more detail:
Through the collaborative actions of these several bodies [IOSCO and the Group
of Thirty] a schedule of agreements emerges focusing initially on the risks associated
with settlement and common conditions for capital adequacy. The issues of future
markets and questions of multiple listings and multinational share offerings are slowly
resolved. Common accounting standards take even longer.
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The other two scenarios acknowledge the possibility of drastic
disruption and discontinuity stemming from either a market break or other
macroeconomic crises. In the second scenario, the major market disruption
creates the political will to establish an institutional regulatory regime at the
international level. Galvanized by necessity, nations would act rapidly and
effectively to set up a new institution (as the current ones, e.g., IOSCO,
prove inadequate) and enforce its decisions. The third scenario is the
opposite-one of conflict and disintegration. Under it, a market break-down
is followed by increasing friction and causes market growth to slow or even
reverse. Efforts for international regulatory cooperation consequently wither
quickly.
29
What is absent in this particularly knowledgeable discussion is an
account of the reasons that may cause any of these scenarios to transpire.
Specifically, why is the first scenario highly likely and more probable to
occur? Why would certain issues take more time and effort to regulate
internationally? Why is IOSCO presumed to be an efficient vehicle for
cooperation in the first scenario, but not in the second or third ones?
Answering these questions, more rigorously than has been attempted so far,
requires us first to understand the possible reasons for cooperation among
nations and for the failure to achieve it. Part III turns to the general
discipline that deals with conflict among nations in order to establish an
analytical framework for answering these questions in the particular context
of international securities regulation.
III. MODELING INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION
A. Central Concepts of International Relations Theory
1. Foreword
This Part argues that well developed analyses in international relations
theory and game theory are essential to understanding the problems facing
national securities regulators in the increasingly global market. It briefly
presents central concepts commonly used in international relations studies to
address questions of conflict and cooperation in the international arena.
These tools will later serve the discussion in the present context by helping
to characterize the type of conflict likely to arise in different areas of
securities regulation and by helping to identify possible institutional
solutions.
29. See id. at 8.
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International relations theory seeks to explain the behavior of nation-
states in the international setting, including their interrelations with their
sister states and international institutions. In principle, the discipline is all-
encompassing in terms of the issue areas covered-it can apply similar tools
to every issue area that has some transnational aspects. Traditionally, it has
focused on national security issues as they relate to the very existence of
states, and thus reflect the quintessential conflict among nations. Issues of
international political economy, and international trade in particular, are also
important topics of international relations studies. Modem studies apply
international relations theories to a panoply of topics, ranging from
telecommunications to space and aviation3' and so forth.
International problems have also traditionally been in the realm of
public international law, but until recently the two disciplines have been
almost completely disconnected. As Robert J. Beck notes, "[i]nternational
relations scholars have simply dismissed international law as either irrelevant
or epiphenomenal: in general, 'law' has been left, rather unceremoniously,
to the lawyers. International Law scholars, meanwhile, have typically
returned the favor, ignoring routinely the work of political scientists on
international rules and institutions."32 This grim picture is now changing.
Over the last decade or so, scholars from both disciplines have begun to
acknowledge the potential benefits of, and thus the need for,
interdisciplinary collaboration. 3 In order to encourage such collaboration
and to pierce the "veil of ignorance," a good deal of introductory work has
been done to familiarize lawyers with the branches and sub-branches of
international relations theory.34
30. See Peter F. Cowhey, The International Telecommunication Regime: The Political Roots
of Regimes for High Technology, 44 INT'L ORG. 169 (1990); Stephen D. Krasner, Global
Communications and National Power: Life on the Pareto Frontier, 43 WORLD PGL. 336 (1991).
31. See Mark W. Zacher, Multilateral Organizations and the Institution of Multilateralism:
The Development of Regimes for Nonterrestrial Spaces, in MULTILATERALISM MArERS: THE THEORY
AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTrTUTIONAL FORM 399 (John G. Ruggie ed., 1993).
32. Robert J. Beck, International Law and International Relations: The Prospects for
Interdisciplinary Collaboration, 1 J. INT'L LEGAL STUD. 119, 119-20 (1995); see also Christopher M.
Rossomondo, International Rules-Approaches from International Law and International Relations,
39 HARV. INT'L L.J. 299, 300-01 (1997) (book review) (tracing the origins of the separation between
the two disciplines).
33. For examples of such legal scholarship, see Kenneth W. Abbott, International Law and
International Relations Theory: Building Bridges-Elements of a Joint Discipline, 86 Am. Soc'y
INT'L L. Pnoc. 167 (1992); Kenneth W. Abbott, Modem International Relations Theory: A
Prospectus for International Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley,
International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 205
(1993); and Anne-Marie Slaughter, Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law:
Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 717 (1995). Calls by prominent political scientists include Oran R. Young, International Lav
and International Relations Theory: Building Bridges-Remarks, 86 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PRoc. 167,
172-75 (1992) and Robert 0. Keohane, International Law and International Relations Theory:
Building Bridges---Compliance with International Commitments: Politics Within a Framework of the
Law, 86 AM. Soc'Y INr'L L. PRoc. 167, 176-80 (1992).
34. See Beck, supra note 32; Slaughter, supra note 33.
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Principled calls for interdisciplinary collaboration notwithstanding, the
proof remains in the pudding, namely, in actual implementation of such
interdisciplinary insights in concrete legal contexts. This Article does so
with regard to securities regulation, about which very little in this vein has
been written so far." Conflicting policies on securities regulation and
competition among states for equity investment and securities businesses are,
in essence, international relations. Presenting the topics from this vantage
point should thus facilitate and enrich their analysis. Furthermore, this work
adds another span to the interdisciplinary bridge by drawing upon law and
economics analyses of securities regulation and corporate governance.36
In reliance on the extant literature, this Part provides only a cursory
overview, in broad strokes, of the central schools of international relations
theory. The following sections describe in more detail, however, how
international relations theory employs game theory to enrich the analysis of
international problems."
2. From Anarchy to Game Theory
The fundamental assumption-indeed, observation-of much of
international relations theory is that "[n]ations dwell in perpetual anarchy,
for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuit of sovereign interests.
.. Because as states, they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct
to [a] supra-national sovereign, they cannot guarantee that they will adhere
to their promises.38
While this statement is agreed upon by most scholars, those called
Realists use anarchy as their primary metaphor for the international system.
Stressing the absence of a central authority capable of creating and imposing
order on the interaction of nation-states, they view countries as competitors
35. For an example of what has been written on this subject, see Gunnar Schuster,
Extraterritoriality of Securities Laws: An Economic Analysis of Jurisdictional Conflicts, 26 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 165 (1994) (applying game theory). Also noteworthy is TONY PORTER, STATES,
MARKETS, AND REGIMES IN GLOBAL FINANCE (1993), which was written by a political scientist and
deals primarily with regulation of the securities and banking industries.
36. For a general argument for applying economic analysis to problems of international law,
see Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis of International Law, 24 YALE J.
INT'LL. 1 (1999).
37. For works that turn to game theory in the context of international law, see William B.T.
Mock, Game Theory, Signalling, and International Legal Relations, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 34 (1992); and John K. Setear, An Iterative Perspective on Treaties: A Synthesis of
International Relations Theory and International Law, 37 HARV. INT'L L.J. 139 (1996).
38. Kenneth A. Oye, Explaining Cooperation Under Anarchy: Hypotheses and Strategies, in
COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY 1, 13-14 (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986). Note that consensus over the
above statement is a starting point for the discussion. By definition, states cannot completely cede their
sovereignty or they cease to be states. As the following paragraphs indicate, scholars differ over the
likely outcomes of this initial situation. See infra text accompanying note 43.
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in a state of nature, and argue that the only order is that which emerges from
competition under anarchy. They treat states as rational actors, as if they
were individuals (the predominant label is "unitary actors") who calculate
costs and benefits and try to maximize returns. Cooperation is unusual,
fleeting, and temporary. International institutions do not exist or are
irrelevant. 9
A paradigm related to yet distinguishable from Realism is
Institutionalism. Institutionalists recognize "'the fact that world politics at
any given time is to some extent institutionalized,' both through '[flormal
international organizations and codified rules and norms' and through less
formalized patterns of behavior 'recognized by participants as reflecting
established rules, norms, and conventions.'"4 International institutions are
closely related to the concept of international regimes that are canonically
defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-
making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given
area of international relations. "41
Liberalism is the main rival school of Realism. Rooted in nineteenth-
century laissez-faire economics, Liberalism argues that harmony and order
emerge from mutually rewarding exchanges between fully informed actors
who recognize the costs of conflict. Liberals point to peace as the norm and
see conflict as a periodic aberration that breaks the tranquillity in which
exchange makes it possible for states to prosper.42 The differences between
the two schools notwithstanding, Realism and Liberalism share core
assumptions. First, there is no centrally mandated order in the international
arena, and no hierarchical government exists to impose authoritative
decisions on nation-states. Second, both schools conceive of states as the
relevant actors in world politics. Third, both schools presume self-
interested, purposive, and calculated behavior of rational state actors.43
Stripped from political science terms such as "state" and
"government," these core assumptions are also the basic assumptions in
game theoretical modeling, and the move from these three assumptions to
the use of game theory models as paradigms of international problems is
straightforward. Hence, game theory, which is widely used to model
economic behavior, quickly came to be seen as a way to model international
phenomena." In fact, it became the basis for important contributions by
39. See ARTHUR A. STEIN, WHY NATIONS COOPERATE 4-7 (1990); Slaughter, supra note
33, at 721-24.
40. Slaughter, supra note 33, at 725-26 (citing ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY vii (1989)).
41. Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as
Intervening Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185, 186 (1982).
42. See STEIN, supra note 39, at 7-8; see also Slaughter, supra note 33, at 727-31.
43. See STEIN, supra note 39, at 8-10. For a different view, arguing that Realism and
Liberalism do not share core assumptions, see generally Joseph M. Grieco, Anarchy and the Limits of
Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism, 42 INT'L ORG. 485 (1988).
44. See STEIN, supra note 39, at 11.
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economists to the study of international politics, especially in the area of
military strategy. 5 Duncan Snidal, a keen user of game theory models, has
even advocated for its use as the general theory of international relations.
According to Snidal:
While the simplicity of game models leads to a clarity that illuminates social
phenomena, the deductive apparatus of game theory allows us to infer new
understandings about international politics. The best-known example is Prisoners'
Dilemma. Analysis in terms of this 2x2 game provides insights on issues such as GATT
or SALT, which could never be achieved by, say, archival research alone.'
As Stein says, "[clertain games, especially [P]risoners' [D]ilemma and
[C]hicken, have been widely used as generic metaphors for international
phenomena." 47 Each in a different way, both those games represent conflict
in its utmost form, as the players are caught in circumstances in which they
have strong incentives not to cooperate, that is, to "defect." 4" When the
game is played in a national security context, and the shadow of a nuclear
mushroom is cast over the scene, the conflict is all the more palpable.49 Yet
other issue areas can also be modeled in this way, and, despite their
predominance, Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken are but a subset of a larger
45. The pioneering work is THOMAS S. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT (1960).
46. Duncan Snidal, The Game Theory of International Politics, in COOPERATION UNDER
ANARCHY, supra note 38, at 28; see also Robert Jervis, Realism, Game Theory, and Cooperation, 40
WORLD POL. 317 (1988) (intersecting models of Realism and "proto-game theory" to explain
international cooperation); Richard E. Quandt, On the Use of Game Models in Theories of
International Relations, 14 WORLD POL. 69 (1961) (exploring productive uses of economic game
theory models on predicting international behavior while setting definite limits on their effectiveness);
Glenn H. Snyder, "Prisoner's Dilemma" and "Chicken" Models in International Politics, 15 INT'L
STUD. Q. 66 (1971) (clarifying differences between the two models in the context of international
politics). But see James K. Sebenius, Challenging Conventional Explanations of International
Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Eplstemic Communities, 46 INT'L ORG. 323 (1992)
(arguing against using game theory, due to its unrealistic assumptions); R. Harrison Wagner, The
Theory of Games and the Problem of International Cooperation, 77 AM. POL. SM. REv. 330 (1983)
(commenting on inadequacy of simple games to explain international cooperation).
47. STEIN, supra note 39, at 11.
48. In the Prisoners' Dilemma game both players have a dominant strategy to defect, so in
the theoretic one-period game cooperation is not achievable although it is Pareto-efficient. Prisoners'
Dilemma is discussed in more detail below in the context of disclosure requirements. In Chicken two
equilibria exist: in one, one player cooperates and the other defects, and vice versa. The game is
conflictual in that each player has an incentive to be the defector. In a repeated game this incentive is
intensified by the desire to establish a reputation of a prone defector. A colorful description and
analysis of Chicken can be found in ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION 72 (2d ed. 1994).
The sources on the Prisoners' Dilemma are innumerable. See, e.g., DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY
AND ECONOMIC MODELING 28-29, 37-39 (1990); PETER C. ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY AND
POLITICAL THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION 206 (1986); RASMUSEN, supra, at 16; Anatol Rapoport, The
Prisoner's Dilemma, in THE NEw PALGRAVE: GAME THEORY 199 (John Eatwell et al. eds.,1989).
49. Classic examples of Prisoners' Dilemma and Chicken games in national security are
arms races ("the security dilemma") and the missile crisis in Cuba, respectively. See Robert Jervis,
Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD POL. 167, 180-88 (1978).
76 THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 24:61
set of games nations can play. This point will be discussed further in Part IV
where specific game models of international securities regulation are
considered.
3. Multilateralism and the Role of Institutions
A special role in international relations studies is attributed to
multilateral forms of organization and regimes in general, and to
international institutions in particular. Being aware of the difficulties that
await nations who want to cooperate, especially in Prisoners' Dilemma-like
situations, students of international relations find it hard to explain
cooperation among a large number of states. When public goods are
involved, the common wisdom is that large numbers of actors will lead to a
higher likelihood that the group will be latent, unable to provide the public
good. The reasons are threefold: (1) the fraction of the group benefit
received by any one individual declines as the group size increases; (2)
larger groups are less likely to exhibit small-group strategic interaction that
could help in collective good provision; and (3) organization costs increase
with an increase in group size. "IT]he larger the group, the farther it falls
short of providing an optimal amount of a collective good."50 There exist
specific obstacles to collective action by a large number of actors. First, the
feasibility of sanctioning declines as the number of actors increases, inter
alia, because sanctioning itself is a public good. Second, recognition and
control problems arise with multiple actors, as it becomes harder to exactly
identify defection and cheating by other actors. Third, controversies between
subsets of the group grow more likely as the group increases in number,
and, consequently, there is a declining ability to identify common interests.5"
Against this backdrop, international regimes and institutions acquire a
central role in facilitating multilateral cooperation. Depending on the
particular circumstances-namely, the game that is being
played-international regimes and institutions can serve in a number of ways
to help the actors emerge from the suboptimal equilibrium that would have
otherwise been dictated by their situation.52 There exist a large variety of
50. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 35 (1965) (emphasis omitted).
51. See Oye, supra note 38, at 19. But see Miles Kahler, Multilateralism with Small and
Large Numbers, 46 INT'L ORG. 681, 702-07 (1992) (describing institutional devices to facilitate
successful multilateral cooperation with large numbers); Robert Pahre, Multilateral Cooperation in an
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, 38 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 326, 428 (1994) (arguing that multilateralism
may make cooperation easier than bilateralism in an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma); see also James D.
Morrow, Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution Versus Information, 48 INT'L
ORG. 387, 418 (1994) (examining the effects of distribution and informational problems on reaching
cooperation, in addition to the problems of monitoring and sanctioning); Scott Barrett, A 7heory of
International Cooperation 3 (last modified June 1998) < http://papers.ssrn.com/
paper.taf?abstractid=123441> (arguing that the number of countries that can sustain full
cooperation depends on the nature of the cooperation problem).
52. For an overview that the text draws upon, arguing that sovereign nations will have
incentive to make joint decisions when confronting dilemmas of common interests or common
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possible 2x2 games, and theoretically one could tailor a role for international
institutions in many of them. 3 Generally, the stronger the incentives players
have to seek an independent path and eschew cooperation, the more powers
will have to be conferred upon the institution. Sometimes a simple
agreement is achievable and enforceable; in other cases, a strong centralized
organization with considerable policing powers must be established. The role
of international institutions will be discussed in further detail and
concreteness when we come to the specific topics of securities regulation and
the games by which they can be modeled. Before doing that, however, the
following Section puts forward and discusses the initial assumptions common
to these models.
B. Methodology and Assumptions
The rest of this Part elaborates on the standard assumptions that are
common in game theoretic analysis of the kind used in this Article. This
Article concentrates on games that can be represented by a 2x2
matrix-what is called the "normal" or "strategic" game form. A 2x2 game
involves two players that have only two ways of action ("strategies") chosen
simultaneously, that interact only once (a "one shot game"), and that cannot
communicate or commit beforehand to a certain way of action. Because such
an analysis is virtually unknown in. the legal literature on securities
regulation (and in order to highlight the effects of choosing these
assumptions and to defend them), these assumptions are discussed at some
length rather than implied by the game form.
It should be stated at the outset that these assumptions are restrictive
and dictate highly stylized models. This is done for at least two reasons.
First, international relations in reality is so complicated that any model, no
matter how sophisticated, would be stylized. This is not to say that more
aversions, see Arthur A. Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 115 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983). See also Lisa Martin, Interests,
Power, and Multilateralism, 46 INT'L ORG. 765 (1992); Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus
Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REv.
923, 941 (1985). Basic discussions of international regimes and institutions can also be found in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES, supra; Robert Axelrod & Robert 0. Keohane, Achieving Cooperation
Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions, in COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY, supra note 38, at
226; Robert 0. Keohane, Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research, 45 INT'L J. 731 (1990); and John
G. Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, 46 INT'L ORG. 561 (1992). See also
MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL FORM, supra note 31;
Kahler, supra note 51. For an international law perspective, see David Kennedy, The Move to
Institutions, 8 CARDOZO L. REv. 841 (1987).
53. I use the terms "institution" and "organization" interchangeably, although in principle
each term bears a different meaning in international relations theory: conceptually, "organization,"
referring typically to a physically existing body, is subsumed in "institution."
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sophisticated models are useless. Indeed, Part IV of this Article explores the
potential benefits of relaxing some of the assumptions made here. The
degree of complexity and finesse becomes one of taste as long as the simpler
models retain a significant value added and their limits are acknowledged.
The use of 2x2 game models as paradigms of international problems is thus
common and useful. Second, the main thrust of this Article is to argue that
different types of conflicts are at the base of different issue areas in
international securities regulation. Two-by-two game models are perhaps the
purest representations of conflictual situations; this makes them a natural
choice here. Notwithstanding their relative simplicity,54 there is a
considerable variety of such games.5" It is this relative simplicity, however,
that enables one to capture the conflictual setting with clarity, while
preserving explanatory power. Two-by-two games are therefore highly
effective in making the point I want to emphasize-namely, that the starting
point in various regulatory issues is different and may thus warrant different
international regimes. These models can later serve as a basis for extensions
and further sophistication,"5 but complicating them with more subtle
assumptions here could only distract attention from this Article's central
point.
1. The Players
The common assumption in many models of international relations is
that the players are sovereign states that are rational and self-interested, and
that act strategically.57 In the securities regulation context, this assumption
calls for some elaboration and qualification. First, regulatory power is
usually vested in administrative agencies that may be seen as agents for the
state. Whether deliberately or not, many countries now follow the U.S.
model of an independent commission entrusted with oversight of the
securities markets. In other countries, this task is undertaken by the Ministry
of Finance. The title of this Article reflects this very phenomenon:
commissions, rather than states, play the game. This is a facet of a general
trend in liberal democracies in which the "state" is disaggregated into its
54. Jervis calls it "proto-game theory." Jervis, supra note 46, at 317 (citing Barry O'Neil,
Game Theory and the Study of Deterrence of War, in PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 134, 135 (Paul
C. Stem et al. eds., 1989)).
55. The exact number of unique 2x2 games is 78. Anatol Rapoport & Melvin J. Guyer, A
Taxonomy of 2x2 Games, 11 GEN. Sys. 203, 204 (1966). Yet, Snyder and Diesing studied the
structure of crisis dynamics and found that nine games can represent all the historical events they
examined. See STEIN, supra note 39, at 76.
56. See Martin, supra note 52, at 768; Oye, supra note 38, at 18; Snidal, supra note 46, at
37; cf. LISA MARTIN, COERCIVE COOPERATION: EXPLAINING MULTILATERAL ECONOMICS SANCTIONS
16 (1992) (utilizing a single-period, two-state model because more realistic models would give rise to
a plethora of equilibria and because the single-period, two-state model would prove useful in
developing testable hypotheses).
57. See Snidal, supra note 46, at 27, 37.
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component political institutions that become responsible for international
legal relations. Some refer to this as "disaggregated sovereignty.""
Second, the interests of such agencies are not necessarily aligned with
those of the state itself or its citizenry. 9 For example, scholars argue that the
SEC had initially acted to make insider trading illegal and subsequently
pursued violators not in order to serve a particular public end, but rather to
enhance its public stature and power or to serve the interests of
intermediaries.' In the same spirit of public choice, some maintain that
governments may have interests of their own that are potentially inimical to
those of the general population. Consequently, a degree of
intergovernmental competition, rather than cooperation, may better serve the
interest of social welfare. 1
Third, even when regulatory authority is held by independent
commissions, the players cannot be regarded as unitary actors. In
democratic regimes of checks and balances, control over policy-making is
divided among several branches. In such cases, domestic controversies
rather than a single national policymaker determine much of the state's
behavior. A telling example is controversies within the American legislature
itself-specifically, between the House Committee on Government
Operations and the Senate Securities Subcommittee of the Senate Committee
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs-about whether the SEC should
increase its unilateral extraterritorial enforcement efforts or rather seek
further multinational cooperation.62 In such cases, however, the securities
commission may be regarded as a "focal actor," that is, an entity that
58. For an excellent exposition of this argument see Anne-Marie Slaughter, International
Lmv in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 503, 504 (1995). See also Martin, supra note
52, at 782 (arguing that democracies are especially subject to the problem of divided control over
policymaking); Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 183, 184
(1997); Joel P. Trachtman, L'Etat, C'est Nous: Sovereignty, Economic Integration and Subsidiarity,
33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 459, 469-71 (1992) (discussing how the principle of subsidiarity determines at
what level of sub-state actors power should reside).
59. See Snidal, supra note 46, at 40.
60. See, e.g., JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS AND POLICY
17 (1991); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulation on Demand: A Private Interest
Model with an Application to Insider Trading Regulation, 30 J.L. & ECON. 311, 314-17 (1987). For
an application in an international context, see Enrico Colombatto & Jonathan R. Macey, A Public
Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State, 18
CARDOZO L. REv. 925, 929 (1996).
61. See Ralph C. Bryant & Edith Hodgkinson, Problems of International Cooperation, in
CAN NATIONS AGREE? ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION 1, 7 (Richard N. Cooper
et al. eds., 1989); see also Kenneth Rogoff, Can International Monetary Policy Be
Counterproductive?, 18 J. INT'L ECON. 199, 199 (1985) (presenting a model in which coordination
among governments adversely influences economic welfare).
62. See Peter E. Millspaugh & Bradley D. Belt, Policing Foreign Trader Abuses in U.S.
Markets: Enforcement Strategy Perspectives, 19 SEC. REG. L.J. 366, 368 (1992).
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operates as a clearing house for the interests of domestic actors
("influencers") who can reward the focal actor for making a decision that
favors them. Hence the collectivity, focal actor plus influencers, behaves
like a unitary rational actor that maximizes a collective utility function.63
Fourth, matters are further complicated by the fact that oftentimes
stock exchanges are self-regulated organizations. As such, they enjoy
partially independent rule-making authority that may overlap with that of the
supervising commission, and in general hold considerable power. Insofar as
they do not violate national statutes and their commission's rules, they may
impose different rules for listing and trading within one country. Problems
may arise when stock exchanges exercise their authority for their own
interests or to benefit influential interest groups, such as management. These
interests are not necessarily equivalent to maximizing national welfare, as
we have assumed with regard to states' interests. Thus, competition (the
race) among exchanges may prove to be more fierce than that among
countries. 4
Notwithstanding these problems, I will assume that commissions play
the game as faithful agents for the state. In other words, I will assume that
the actual operation of the securities laws is undertaken by a professional
administrative agency acting bona fide in the interest of its national
constituencies. To be sure, the issues just mentioned might impede attempts
to derive a state's payoff structure from reliable sources. From the other
player-regulator's viewpoint, these concerns could create uncertainties with
regard to the game actually being played, as it would not be able to ascertain
"who is in charge" and "what are they up to." Nevertheless, the complexity
of liberal democratic regimes does not have to bear negatively on their
63. See Andrew Kydd & Duncan Snidal, Progress in Game-Theoretical Analysis of
International Regimes, in REGIME THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 112, 128-30 (Volker
Rittberger ed., 1993). The issue of domestic controversies is related to the notion of two-level games.
In these models, a negotiator on behalf of the state simultaneously tries to appease her foreign
counterparts as well as her domestic interest groups. In such a framework, domestic problems could
be used strategically as a leverage. See Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Policy: The Logic
of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427, 434 (1988); see also Robert D. Putnam & C. Randall
Henning, The Bonn Summit of 1978: A Case Study in Coordination, in CAN NATIONS AGREE? ISSUES
IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION, supra note 61, at 12, 16 (showing that reaching the
Bonn Accord among the G-7 at the 1978 summit in Bonn was catalyzed by influential minority
factions within each government that exploited external pressures). See generally Robert Pahre & Paul
Papayoanou, Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and International Politics, 41 J. CONFLICT RESOL.
3 (1997).
64. See Marcel Kahan, Some Problems with Stock Exchange-Based Securities Regulation, 83
VA. L. REv. 1509, 1514-18 (1997) (arguing that stock exchanges are not the type of regulatory
bodies that will most vigorously compete and have the greatest expertise with respect to securities
regulation); see also Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class
Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 119, 127-32 (1987) (discussing the potential for a "race to the
bottom" among stock exchanges); Jeffrey N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and
the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CAL. L. REv. 1, 69 (1988) (discussing competition among
exchanges in the United States); cf. Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REv.
1453, 1477-91 (1997) (arguing that regulatory competition by exchanges is likely to result in better
rules than governmental regulation).
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ability to make credible commitments; indeed, it may even enhance it."
Thus, we can justify treating the state as a unitary actor.
2. Maximands
I will assume, as is commonly done, that states seek to maximize
national social welfare (their maximand) thus excluding any altruistic motive
to maximize aggregate international welfare per se. In the context of
international securities markets, states may seek various goals: (1) to
increase foreign investments in domestic firms' equity; (2) to increase local
trading volume as a source for commissions and derivative businesses; (3) to
increase liquidity and depth in order to stabilize the national economy and to
draw further investments; and/or (4) to enable its residents to take advantage
of international diversification of their portfolios.
In addition to absolute welfare gains, states often see relative gains, or
rank, as a maximand. The international securities market was not saved
from this fate. Since the late 1980s, American policy makers, the business
community, and scholars have become more concerned with the global
competitiveness of American securities markets. The SEC in particular,
when it announced its pro-cooperation policy, was careful to emphasize that
the United States would strive to preserve its leadership position.66 Similar
considerations have constantly hampered the efforts of EU Member States to
agree on directives pertaining to the securities market.67
3. Two-State Games
Inherent to the 2x2 game model is the assumption that the number of
players is only two. Obviously, this is an unrealistic picture of the world, in
which the actual number is almost a hundred times greater. Even the number
of economically significant countries-say, the OECD members and some
Far Eastern countries-is much larger. In the realm of competition for legal
regimes, moreover, it may be the smaller, "insignificant" countries that
paradoxically acquire special importance, and thus warrant consideration.
Delaware, in the domestic market for corporate charters, and certain
banking and tax havens are famous examples of small states with
considerable significance.
65. See Kurt Taylor Gaubatz, Democratic States and Commitment in International Relations,
50 INT'L ORG. 109, 110, 120-23 (1996).
66. See SEC, Policy Statement, supra note 24, 89,576.
67. See Benn Steil, Equity Trading IV: The ISD and the Regulation of European Market
Structure, in THE EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS 113, 133-34 (Benn Steil ed., 1996).
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A 2x2 game might be said further to imply a bilateral monopoly and,
hence, the existence of market power, rather than a competitive market with
no market power. Such a claim would be true only in part. Once states
internationalize their securities markets, they might in fact find themselves in
bilateral relationships with other states, as, for example, after a dual listing
or a linkage between two national exchanges.
4. Ordinal Payoff Structure
The game models used here are further stylized by employing ordinal
preference orders to denote payoff structures.68 Admittedly, cardinal payoff
structures would convey more information about states' preferences by
expressing the intensity of interest they have in each outcome. Alternatively,
they could be interpreted as reflecting differences in the players' size. A
large state with relatively large absolute utility payoffs finding itself in an
unsatisfactory equilibrium outcome could thus use threats or side payments
to change its rival's payoff structure, which is smaller in absolute terms, and
with it change the equilibrium outcome. Ordinal payoff structures are
insensitive to such aspects.
Notwithstanding these drawbacks, ordinal payoffs are superior in the
present context. Ordinal utility functions symbolize states' revealed
preferences. They represent actual behavior-a reflection of choice. Cardinal
utility functions, on the other hand, are notoriously problematic as they are
imposed on actual behavior through the modeler's subjective judgment. In
most cases cardinal payoff structures would necessitate arbitrary assumptions
which may render the entire analysis more questionable. Particularly in the
regulatory realm, policy-making is often done according to prior beliefs but
without clear "prices" or other numerical values. Thus, determining cardinal
payoff structures is a much more dubious task when states are involved as
opposed to profit-maximizing firms or even individuals.
5. Static Analysis
Another implication of the 2x2 matrix model is the static nature of the
analysis. It is a single-period model, in which both states decide
simultaneously on the nature of their regulatory regime with respect to a
certain issue area. This assumption implies that neither state can expect to
exploit the other state's position after it has made its move, nor can it expect
to be able to retaliate if the other state exploits the former's position after
her move is made.
68. An ordinal payoff structure states a player's order of preference with regard to all
possible outcomes. If a player prefers outcome A over outcome B then the outcome payoffs will be
denoted 2 and 1, respectively. A cardinal payoff structure states a player's utilities from all possible
outcomes. Utility could be denoted in monetary or other units, and players are assumed to prefer high
utility outcomes over low utility ones.
2x2 Games of International Securities Regulation
Abstracting from iterated games is particularly significant in light of
the now common wisdom that, under certain conditions, such games may
give rise to cooperation. Allowing two players to interact under a "shadow
of the future" created by the repeated games may yield more cooperational
equilibria than the one-period model.69 In the case of Prisoners' Dilemma,
relaxing the one-period assumption may cause the model to point at an
opposite outcome where reciprocity and, consequently, cooperation may
emerge.70
As already noted, understanding the basic one-period situation is
nonetheless important because it clarifies the underlying conflict that
requires reconciliation. Also, in certain cases, it is the multiple-period game
model that entails unrealistic assumptions.7" In the particular context of this
Article, a multiple-period model could be as unrealistic as the single-period
one. The securities regulatory process is generally quite slow, and with
regard to international aspects it may be even more so. In addition, once
private players have adjusted to a new regulatory policy it would be very
difficult to unwind it. Finally, part and parcel of repeated game models is
the notion of possible retaliation. In the regulatory context, however, it is
more difficult to conceive of possible retaliation than in, say, the
international trade or taxation contexts.
72
6. Dichotomous Strategies
The final assumption is that states can only make dichotomous
decisions, that is, that only two strategies are available to them.
Understandably, the two strategies are set in opposition, that is, "cooperate"
and "defect" (that is, totally eschew cooperation). This again is a strong
assumption, since regulators usually enjoy ample discretion to take various
kinds of action and engage in various degrees of intervention. For example,
when deciding on disclosure requirements, which will be discussed shortly
below, a regulator may decide that a certain item has to be disclosed on an
69. See Axelrod & Keohane, supra note 52, at 232-33; Oye, supra note 38, at 13-14;
Snidal, supra note 46.
70. See generally RASMUSEN, supra note 48, chs. 5-6. A classic work is ROBERT AXELROD,
THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). Cf. Wagner, supra note 46, at 332-33 (arguing that
cooperation may emerge even in a two-period game).
71. For an argument against using game theory in such contexts, see Sebenius, supra note
46.
72. Customs duties or denial of certain tax benefits could be imposed relatively quickly and,
more importantly, in a way that would target foreign entities or transactions, often differentiating on a
national basis. A well-designed and well-intended regulatory regime (namely, one that is not meant
solely as a regulatory burden with equivalent effects of custom duties) would be less likely to be
targeted toward foreign elements in order to inflict harm on them.
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annual, quarterly, or immediate basis, and should include particular details
or not. Notwithstanding the richness that gradual games may add to the
discussion, '3 many controversies can be distilled to a "yes-or-no" question,
such that a dichotomous game may still be satisfactory.
IV. GAMES OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION
This Part constitutes the main part of the Article. In it, I offer an
analytical matrix whereby three fundamental issues of securities regulation
are assessed-the regulation of disclosure, fraud, and insider trading-in
terms of sources of international diversity and the correlated games that, I
argue, characterize the interaction between regulators in these areas. The
areas covered are the main components of the "investor protection" element
of any securities regulation regime and those that are tightly connected to
corporate governance.' In addition to these topics, each regime usually
includes a component of market regulation under which one can find the
regulation of stock exchanges and market professionals. While the latter
areas also have a role in investor protection, a full discussion of them would
involve issues that are beyond the scope of this Article.
The analysis proceeds in the following way. For each issue area, the
first step is to offer a plausible "story" characterizing states' typical policies.
Modeling is an exercise in stylized story telling, so for a model to be
relevant and useful there has to be a situation in reality that it represents.
The stories of interest are those about diversity in regulatory policy making.
For this purpose, I trace the sources of international diversity in securities
regulation policies on various issue areas, emphasizing the economic and
political economy bases.
Second, for each possible national policy story I derive the
corresponding payoff structure, namely, how countries might (ordinally)
value each of the possible outcomes of their interaction. By reflecting the
players' interests and preferences, the payoff structure actually reflects their
policies; focusing on the payoff structure that securities regulators face in the
international arena will illuminate the implications of various regulatory
policies.
Finally, I show how policies interact with similar or different ones in
2x2 games. The games analyzed share the common assumptions discussed
above and differ only in their payoff structure. In light of the results
suggested by each specific game, I discuss the prospects for international
cooperation and optimal mechanisms for obtaining sustainable cooperation.
73. See Snidal, supra note 52, at 927-28 (arguing that actors are often presented with a
whole range of intermediate choices).
74. For a discussion of the connection between securities regulation and corporate
governance, see Licht, supra note 26.
2x2 Games of International Securities Regulation
A. Disclosure Regulation
1. Sources of International Diversity
For a conflict to arise, there must exist some non-mutuality in the
players' interests. With regard to disclosure regulation, the question is: Why
do certain differences in disclosure requirements exist in various countries'
securities laws? Why don't we observe universal consensus on the need for
more disclosure or universal agreement on the information that needs to be
disclosed?
International diversity in disclosure regimes stems from the complex
nature of the information that is usually required to be disclosed. Disclosure
rules may diverge with regard to a host of parameters: the required issue
items; specificity of information-for example, line of business reporting
versus company level results; treatment of soft (future-facing) information;
different treatments of initial public offerings and ongoing disclosure; and
the timing of disclosure. Strictness or laxness are equally determined by the
accompanying public and private enforcement mechanisms. Public
enforcement is affected by the powers, budget, and staff conferred to
regulatory authorities. Private enforcement is affected by the powers that
potential plaintiffs enjoy when they wish to enforce their right to
information. These include legal formulas for liability, the potentially liable
parties, and measures for damages. Some of the relevant provisions are
found in the legal sources pertaining to securities, but others are frequently
determined by general rules of procedure and the laws of obligations in each
country.
Further diversity stems from differing interests of market participants.
First, consider issuers. On the one hand, issuers prefer to withhold
information to the extent that its disclosure may adversely affect their
business situation. This could happen, for example, when competitors can
extract sensitive information from the reports. Instances where it was argued
that disclosure requirements are actually destructive to issuers include
reporting of results with a line-of-business breakdown and, more recently,
reporting of exposure to market risk.7' On the other hand, companies tend to
75. On line-of-business reporting, see Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of
Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 763, 792-98 (1995). On exposure-to-risk disclosure, see
Merton H. Miller & Christopher L. Culp, The SEC's Costly Disclosure Rules, WALL ST. J., April 25,
1996, at A14. A perverse example was recently given with regard to Russian companies. Since the
effective tax rate in Russia is greater than 100%, and payments are also due to organized crime
elements, shareholders have a perverse incentive not to have the company accurately report its
financial situation. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate
Law, 109 HARV. L. Rv. 1911, 1927-28 (1996).
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disclose information in order to attract investors. Though these aspects are
discussed further below, the point here is that different regulatory systems
could readily strike different balances between these considerations.
Consider now the investors. Indexing investors and those having no
control position in the companies in which they invest usually prefer more
disclosure by the company. Investors may be closer to a control or insider
position, for example, by crossing a holding threshold of five percent or ten
percent or by initiating a tender offer. We would generally expect such
investors to prefer less stringent disclosure duties, since they oftentimes have
direct information sources in the company, and, as to themselves, they often
prefer as minimal disclosure as possible. As the shareholder base of many
companies becomes more internationalized, several legal systems may have
an interest in regulating their disclosure.
The third element is the markets (stock exchanges) that have rule-
making powers. In order to attract issuers to list and investors to trade, they
can require disclosure beyond what is prescribed by the securities
commission (requiring less disclosure will not be effective, of course).76
Even if disclosure rules could readily diverge, the question remains:
Why should they do so? Investor protection and market integrity are invoked
as the justification for a mandatory corporate disclosure system, 7 but this
still calls for guidance as to the problems investors face and the optimal level
of disclosure. -As a general rule, a benevolent regulator should promulgate
disclosure duties to counter information asymmetries that cannot be cured by
market forces. The literature on this issue is voluminous and not free of
debate,7" but in general market failure is claimed to warrant a mandatory
disclosure regime. One convincing argument points out that information is a
public good by nature, so an efficient regime should subsidize its
76. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure
System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1983).
78. For an overview, see ROMANO, supra note 8, ch. 6 (1993). For a strong position against
mandatory disclosure, see George J. Benston, The Costs and Benefits of Government-Required
Disclosure: SEC and FTC Requirements, in CORPORATIONS AT THE CROSSROADS: GOVERNANCE AND
REFORM 37, 40-48 (D. DeMott ed., 1980); and George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock
Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. Rv. 132, 134-53
(1973).
Easterbrook and Fischel's basic premise is similar to Benston's, namely, that issuers in general
have the right incentives to disclose the correct amount of information, because otherwise investors
would fear the worst and discount the value of the issuer's stock. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra
note 8, ch. 11 (1991). Although appealing, the argument is not as self-evident as Easterbrook and
Fischel present it. Without exceeding the scope of this Article, it should be mentioned that investors'
beliefs and fears are framed by previous experience and social conventions. Even if investors might
contemplate the worst as a possibility, they may not necessarily attribute a high probability to it.
Finally, the argument that disclosure is in fact subject to a "race to the top" has been recently
formalized and extended to stock exchanges by Steven Huddart, John S. Hughes, and Markus
Brunnermeier. See Steven Huddart et al., Disclosure Requirements and Stock Exchange Listing
Choice in an International Context, Working Paper, Fuqua School of Business, Duke University
(1998).
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production.79 Another market failure occurs because of positive externalities
that corporate disclosure confers upon competing firms."0 Finally, the
agency problem inherent to the relationship between shareholders and
company insiders"I also warrants mandatory disclosure by the latter. 2 Under
this reasoning, mandatory disclosure constitutes external intervention in the
corporate governance system83 prevailing in each country. Because corporate
governance systems across the globe exhibit considerable diversity, it is only
natural that mandatory disclosure regimes would also diverge. 4
Empirical evidence suggests that financial disclosure levels in various
countries play an important role in the decision to make an international
listing.85 From a regulatory perspective, these considerations are translated
into terms of regulatory burden on issuers and traders. A securities regulator
maximizing national welfare can strike a balance suitable for the domestic
conditions, having regard to the prevailing domestic corporate governance
structures. But as markets internationalize, external constraints are set by
competing markets, and too high a burden will eventually lead to regulatory
arbitrage and migration of businesses to other jurisdictions.86 The securities
industry (stock exchanges and securities houses), as well as securities
79. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory
Disclosure System, 70 VA. L. REv. 717, 723-24 (1984). See generally Joel Seligman, The
Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities
Regulation, 93 MICH. L. Rnv. 649 (1995) (reviewing the need for a mandatory disclosure system in
light of recent developments in the practice and theory of securities markets).
80. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 8, ch. 11.
81. For the classic exposition of this point, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meclding,
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). See
generally Mark J. Roe, Comparative Corporate Governance, Working Paper No. 125, Columbia
University School of Law at 345 (1997) (forthcoming in THE NEw PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF LAW
AND ECONOMICS). Note that no assumption is required with regard to the exact structure of ownership
rights in the corporation. Although agency problems are more evident in a dispersed ownership
structure, more prevalent in the United States is that agency problems arise whenever there is a
discrepancy between ownership and control. See Jensen & Meckling, supra.
82. See Paul G. Mahoney, Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1047, 1090-93 (1995).
83. A corporate governance system comprises the rules of company law that are in force in
each country together with the actual holding structures that are common in that country.
84. For a discussion, see Licht, supra note 26, at 284-85.
85. See Gary Biddle & Shahrokh M. Saudagaran, The Effects of International Disclosure
Levels on Firms' Choices Among Alternative Foreign Stock Exchange Listings, 1 J. INT'L FIN. MGMT.
& ACCTG. 55, 56 (1989); Shahrokh M. Saudagaran & Gary C. Biddle, Foreign Listing Location: A
Study of MNCs and Stock Exchanges in Eight Countries, 26 J. INT'L BUS. STUD. 319, 320 (1995).
Disclosure requirements are but one of many factors influencing a company's decision to list its stock
overseas. See Kent H. Baker, 1Why U.S. Companies List on the London, Frankfurt, and Tokyo Stock
Exchanges, 6 J. INT'L SEC. MARKETS 219, 225 (1992).
86. See, e.g., Grundfest, supra note 8, at 369; Seligman, supra note 79, at 673-702.
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regulators, are keenly aware of this fact and indeed perceive it as exerting
pressure to relax strict-and, therefore, burdening-regulation.8"
Note that by requiring disclosure, the regulator in effect supplies a
public good-this time in the form of disclosure rules. Consider a dual-listed
company whose shares trade in two markets with different disclosure
standards. Clearly, once the company satisfied the disclosure requirement set
by the more stringent market, the rules prescribed by the more lax one are
also satisfied. The outcome exhibits the classic features of a public good:
consumption of the rules' benefits (the disclosed information) is non-
excludable and there is no rivalry in consumption. Free riding by the more
lax market is thus expected, and, consequently, disclosure may end up being
under-induced and information under-supplied.
Moreover, even when a company is listed on a single market, a
negative externality may occur with regard to foreign shareholders. A
national-welfare-maximizing regulator might under-induce disclosure as long
as the benefits accruing to the economy from foreign investment and
financial business exceed the potential harms of under-disclosure to its
constituency.
2. The Correlated Games and International Cooperation
a. Prisoners' Dilemma Games
Either as an externality or as a public good situation, the corresponding
2x2 game is the Prisoners' Dilemma. Consider first a company choosing one
out of two markets for listing its stock. Recall that by inducing suboptimal
disclosure level-through lax rules or weak enforcement-a state can
externalize adverse effects to its rival. The payoff structure for both states is
that of the Prisoners' Dilemma: each player most prefers to defect, i.e., to
under-induce disclosure, when the other state cooperates, i.e., induces an
optimal (higher) disclosure level (the circumstance is denoted DC). 88 The
second-best outcome is one of mutual cooperation (CC), and the third-best is
mutual defection (DD). The least preferred outcome materializes when one
state cooperates while the other defects (CD). The players' preference order
87. See, e.g., James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms
Appropriate?, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. S58, S59-67 (1994); James L. Cochrane et al., Foreign
Equities and U.S. Investors: Breaking Down the Barriers Separating Supply and Demand, 2 STAN.
J.L. Bus. & FIN. 241, 243-44 (1996) (the authors were, at the time of publication, staff members of
the New York Stock Exchange).
88. Hereinafter I will use the double capital letter notation to denote the players' payoff
structure. C denotes cooperation, and D denotes defection. The first letter in each pair denotes the
player's own strategy, and the second the rival player's strategy. The Prisoners' Dilemma's payoff
structure is thus denoted by DC > CC > DD > CD, which is equivalent to the other common
notation: t (temptation to defect) > c (cooperation) > p (punishment for mutual defection) > s
(sucker's payoff, i.e., unilateral cooperation).
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is thus DC > CC > DD > CD, and Figure 1 shows the strategic form of
the game.
FIGURB 1. PRISONERS' DILEMMA
Column
C D*
C 3, 3 1, 4
Row
D*
4, 1 2, 2**
Payoffs to (Row, Column)
Cell numerals refer to each player's ordinally ranked payoffs.
" Player's dominant strategy
Equilibrium outcome
The same outcome obtains for a multiple listing situation, in which a
stringent disclosure regime is a public good, 9 since the benefits of such a
regime are non-excludable and are not subject to rivalry in consumption.
The regulators' preference orders reflect a payoff structure compatible with
a Prisoners' Dilemma, as shown in Figure 1: each regulator would rather
free ride on her colleague's disclosure regime rather than induce it herself.
This should come as little surprise. Students of international relations have
identified several international problems-from national security to
international tradeP-as situations involving a public good, and have treated
the supply of public goods as a Prisoners' Dilemma.9 Disclosure duties are
89. For a discussion, see Licht, supra note 1, at 627.
90. Analogies from international trade to international securities regulation warrant caution.
International securities regulation is different from international trade in that the former lacks the
discriminatory effect between domestic and foreign interests. Securities regulation rules-particularly,
disclosure rules-apply equally to domestic and foreign registrants. Suboptimal disclosure rules would
inflict considerable harm to domestic investors and companies, so regulators are likely to use them
less aggressively compared with custom duties and other protectionist measures, in order to attract
foreign listings. Note, however, that certain foreign issuers in the United States enjoy a laxer
disclosure regime. Rule 12g3-2 under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 17 C.F.R. §
240.12g3-2 (1998), exempts foreign issuers from reporting duties if there are fewer than 300
shareholders of a certain class residing in the United States.
91. See, e.g., Robert Jervis, Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma, 30 WORLD POL.
167, 170-78 (1978). In the international political economy context, Kindelberger's work is a
prominent example for the argument that an open world trading system is a public good. See CHARLES
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thus no exception. To the extent that mandatory disclosure rules can directly
be translated to degrees of regulatory burden, then the Prisoners' Dilemma
may also serve as a heuristic model.
Put succinctly, the prospects for cooperation in a Prisoners' Dilemma
situation are theoretically nil. Both players have a dominant strategy to
defect; that is, irrespective to what its rival does, each player prefers to
defect, either in order to exploit its rival's cooperation or to protect itself
from being exploited.' The outcome is a Nash equilibrium in DD: namely,
if both players choose to play D neither one of them would have an incentive
to change its strategy. This is clearly unsatisfactory since CC is Pareto-
efficient93 compared with DD but cannot sustain an equilibrium.
Under the assumptions employed heretofore, this point would mark the
end of the discussion. Any effort to induce cooperation requires means that
are beyond the simple 2x2 game. The basic form of cooperation-a bilateral
agreement between the players-is excluded by the 2x2 game model. The
players cannot make credible commitments to cooperate because the game
has only one period; as a result, no retaliation can take place. Multilateral
agreements (also beyond the 2x2 game model) might worsen the problem
due to monitoring and verification difficulties, leading to free riding.94
Real-life situations, however, may exhibit a conflict structure akin to
the Prisoners' Dilemma yet allow for mechanisms that are beyond the simple
model to overcome problems inherent in the structure. International
institutions in particular are an important mechanism for facilitating
cooperation,95 and they may be tailored to fit the specific problem the parties
face. Resolving a problem with a Prisoners' Dilemma payoff structure
would require a strong, centralized organization, upon which the member
states confer significant powers of rule prescription and dispute resolution,
P. KINDELBERGER, THE WORLD IN DEPRESSION 1929-1939, at 28 (1973); Charles P. Kindelberger,
Dominance and Leadership in the International Economy: Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free
Rides, 25 INT'L STUD. Q. 242, 247-48 (1981); see also MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE PossimILrry oF
COOPERATION 13-14 (1987).
However, a thoughtful critique by John Coneybeare has pointed out that public goods problems
and those of Prisoners' Dilemma do not necessarily overlap. In particular, free trade is not a public
good problem and not even a pure Prisoners' Dilemma. See John A.C. Coneybeare, Public Goods,
Prisoners' Dilemma, and the International Political Economy, 28 INT'L STUD. Q. 5, 8-10 (1984)
(arguing that the good in Prisoners' Dilemma-freedom-is excludable and subject to rivalry, and thus
is not a public good); see also TAYLOR, supra, at ch. 2 (arguing that in public good problems
individual preferences are not necessarily those of a Prisoners' Dilemma but rather of games like
Chicken and Stag Hunt (Assurance)).
92. Finding whether a dominant strategy exists is relatively easy in the presentation form
used here. First, in Figure 1, put yourself in Row's shoes and assume that Column played C. In this
case, Row's best response would be to play D. Now assume that Column played D. Again, Row
would play D. Playing D thus turns out to be the best response to any of Column's strategies. This
makes it a dominant strategy for Row. The same reasoning applies, respectively, to Column.
93. A Pareto-efficient situation obtains where there is no way to deviate from the status quo
also that no individual is made worse off and at least one is made better off.
94. See supra Subsection III.A.3.
95. See generally Martin, supra note 52.
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and to which they provide sufficient resources for monitoring and
enforcement.96
In addition to exercising their central authority to enforce cooperation,
international institutions can help member states change the Prisoners'
Dilemma payoff structure altogether, through issue linkage. Suppose that
state A has an interest that state B raise its disclosure requirements, while
state B would like state A to change its broker-dealer regulation policy or,
for the sake of the argument, its banking regulation policy. An international
organization in which both states are members and to which these issues are
relevant can facilitate cooperation, since linking the issues during the
negotiations allows both states to see the aggregate payoff favorably.
In the securities regulation context, presenting the problem as a
Prisoners' Dilemma game may help in explaining the stark differences in the
achievements of the two major institutions, the European Union and IOSCO.
The European Union boasts an impressive array of directives covering most
aspects of securities regulation, including disclosure.9 7 Starting in 1979, the
then EC Commission promulgated a series of directives intended to simplify
and establish minimum standards regulating the relationship of public
companies and stockholders. The first three directives harmonized certain
requirements concerning admission to stock exchange listing,98 listing
particulars,99 and half-yearly reporting. I"° Pursuant to the Single European
Market program, later directives were based on the principle of mutual
recognition. An important 1989 directive on public offer prospectuses and a
number of amendments to the early directives have implemented that
96. See id. at 770-71.
97. EU regulation of financial services in general is aimed to ensure that essential minimum
standards are respected in all member states, so that financial services can be provided throughout the
Community on the basis of a "single license" from the home state. However, this does not prevent the
host state from regulating the activity on a nondiscriminatory basis. A series of directives,
promulgated by the European Council, cover issues such as listing particulars required from listed
companies, ongoing reporting duties, public offerings, and insider trading. Other thorny issues
covered by EU directives, such as stock exchange regulation and capital adequacy, also resemble a
Prisoners' Dilemma problem. For a legal overview, see STANBROOK & HOOPER AND KPMG
EUROPEAN HEADQUARTERS, A BUSINESS GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LEGISLATION 595 (1995).
For an excellent general overview and assessment, see THE EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS (Benn Steil
ed., 1996). See also Manning Gilbert Warren III, The European Union's Investment Services
Directive, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 181, 187-90 (1994).
98. Council Directive 79/279 on Coordinating the Conditions for the Admission of
Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing, 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21.
99. Council Directive 80/390 on Coordinating the Requirements for the Drawing Up,
Scrutiny and Distribution of the Listing Particulars to Be Published for the Admission of Securities to
Official Stock Exchange Listing, 1980 O.J. (L 100) 1.
100. Council Directive 82/121 on Information to Be Published on a Regular Basis by
Companies the Shares of Which Have Been Admitted to Official Stock Exchange Listing, 1982 O.J.
(L 48) 26.
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principle in the disclosure area. It may be true that by American standards
some of the directives' requirements are rudimentary. This is true, for
instance, in the case of the semiannual reporting requirement, since in the
United States reporting is done on a quarterly basis and is far more detailed.
On the other hand, no other group of states has come anywhere close to the
overall achievements of the European Union in creating a quasi-uniform
disclosure regime.'
IOSCO, indeed, aspires to establish a worldwide set of disclosure
duties to be used as a common basis for multinational securities offerings
and listings. Such standards are particularly in the interest of multinational
corporations that prefer to have a uniform business language, and, to this
end, IOSCO signed an agreement in July 1995 with the International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) on a work plan to be completed by
the turn of the century. According to Michael Sutton, "[i]n April 1996,
IASC announced an intention to accelerate that plan with the objective of
completing the core standards by March 1998. " I2 That deadline was not
met, and, as of June 1998, while most of the work plan had been completed,
certain thorny issues still remained open.'13
From the outset, a major obstacle to such an agreement was U.S.
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the SEC's insistence
that those standards not be overly compromised by the International
Accounting Standards (IAS). In October 1997 the SEC reported to Congress
on the outlook for successful completion of IASC and stated that it might
propose changes to its current reporting requirements for foreign private
registrants."° The SEC emphasized, however, that before doing so, it will
closely scrutinize the core standards to ensure they meet certain criteria." 5
In this context, for one of the most problematic and contentious issues left
on IASC's table-accounting for financial instruments (e.g., derivatives)-
IASC considered adopting the American rules in order to avoid direct
confrontation with the SEC and to secure its support." 6 Eventually, IASC
members voted the proposal down, apparently because it was American. 7 It
101. But see infra text accompanying notes 125-126 (discussing MJDS).
102. Michael H. Sutton, Financial Reporting in U.S. Capital Markets: International
Dimensions, 11 ACCT. HoRIzoNs 96, 98 (1997).
103. See Robert Bruce, Tolstoy Would Have Been Proud of IASC, TIMES (London), May 14,
1998, at 32; see also Financial Assets and Liabilities: The Next Steps, IASC INSIGHTS, Dec. 1997, at
11; Karen M. Kroll, Closing the GAAP?, INDUSTRY WVK., Nov. 3, 1997, at 61.
104. See SEC, REPORT ON PROMOTING GLOBAL PREEMINENCE OF AMERICAN SECURITIES
MARKETS 18, Oct. 1997, available in <http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/acctgsp.htm>.
105. See id. at 15. The main criteria required from IASC standards are that they (1)
constitute a comprehensive basis for accounting; (2) are of high quality, result in comparability and
transparency, and provide for full disclosure; and (3) can and will be rigorously interpreted and
applied. See id.
106. See Robert Bruce, A Fudge That Could Lead to an Alliance, TIMES (London), Sept. 18,
1997, at 32.
107. See Accounting Standards: America v. The World, ECONOMIST, Jan. 17, 1998, at 58;
see also Bruce, supra note 103 (reviewing developments in the IAS project); A Fair System for
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should be borne in mind that even when IASC does hand over to IOSCO an
agreed-upon set of standards for approval, the SEC has the power to veto
them. In the meantime, the SEC refuses to allow foreign issuers to use
international standards in making public offerings or stock exchange listings
in the United States.
This -brings us back to the Prisoners' Dilemma. States are usually very
reluctant to compromise their sovereignty, and establishing an international
organization in order to overcome the Prisoners' Dilemma problem in itself
requires overcoming such a problem; countries are therefore reluctant to do
this. One strategy for establishing a truly strong central institution is to do it
gradually over time. Both the European Union and the World Trade
Organization (WTO) are examples of this phenomenon. The European
Union gained power gradually over a long period. The WTO was
established almost forty years after the GATT signatories had failed to
establish the International Trade Organization (ITO) and instead were
limited to lowering trade barriers in a number of rounds of negotiations.
More importantly, in the case of the European Union, the major (and most
hard to reach) achievements with respect to financial services regulation
were part of a broader program for creating a single European market. This
program in itself is a subpart of a wider process transforming Europe from a
group of nation-states into a union with confederate qualities, the ultimate
end of which is to ensure peaceful coexistence of nation-states in Western
Europe. 1
08
Nothing of this is shared by IOSCO. While the EU harmonization
project is the most ambitious in its substantive scope, IOSCO is the largest
and most ambitious cooperation initiative in terms of global coverage, with a
membership of some 135 securities regulators and stock exchanges
worldwide.1"9 IOSCO's members represent very diverse countries, and with
the steady growth in its membership this diversity will only increase."' In
terms of personnel resources, IOSCO is a very small institution."' It was
Financial Instruments, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 8, 1998, at 10.
108. See generally WILLIAM WALLACE, REGIONAL INTEGRATION: THE WEST EUROPEAN
EXPERIENCE (1994). At the international level, trade wars, too, may well have far-reaching political
ramifications. Among the reasons that the United States pushed for establishing the ITO and GATr
was the recognition that international economic affairs had a role in causing World War II. See, e.g.,
JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 293 (3d ed.
1995).
109. See INT'L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS, ANNUAL REPORT 1996, at 1 (1996).
110. IOSCO partially acknowledges this diversity by having special bodies and holding
special programs dedicated to emerging markets. See id. at 18.
111. IOSCO employs two full-time professional staff members and three administrative staff
members in addition to its Secretary General. See id. at 30. This is not even a shadow of the European
Union's huge bureaucracy and is also smaller than Directorate General XV, the European Union's
body in charge of securities markets.
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once described as "primarily a talk shop for regulators""' and today this
description is still quite accurate. In sum, IOSCO looks like a recipe for how
not to succeed in solving a Prisoners' Dilemma situation."'
The stark differences between the European Union and IOSCO and
IOSCO's ostensibly inappropriate structure for overcoming Prisoners'
Dilemma-like conflicts call for more elaboration on the Prisoners' Dilemma
as the right heuristic, on disclosure regulation in general, and on IOSCO
itself.
With regard to the Prisoners' Dilemma, its usefulness for explaining
international relations situations should never be overemphasized. Although
it has some very elegant features as a model for hard cases, situations can be
quite problematic in terms of reaching cooperation without having all of its
traits. This, indeed, is the central argument of this Article-that other game
models better explain interactions between national securities regulators." 4
IOSCO's structure could thus indicate that it has a slim chance of bringing
about a harmonized international disclosure regime and that in pursuing such
projects its members may be wasting their time. On the other hand,
IOSCO's structure could indicate that there are additional factors influencing
the development of an international disclosure regime. If that were the case,
then perhaps other game models could do a better explanatory job. The
following paragraphs pursue this line of argument with models of relative
gains games and of hegemonic stability.
As to disclosure, the fact that IOSCO does engage in a project in this
field indicates that its members see a chance for reaching an agreement on
disclosure regulation. While the members could be wrong, an alternative
explanation is that disclosure regulation is richer than what has been
assumed to date. Certain aspects of it may not exhibit the traits of the
Prisoners' Dilemma and thus may not invoke dynamics akin to a race to the
bottom. This avenue is further pursued in Subsection IV.A.3 on accounting
standards.
Finally, in light of its structure, IOSCO may be better geared toward
establishing international cooperation in areas other than disclosure, such as,
for example, antifraud regulation. Conflicts in such areas may be less severe
or nonexistent so that they may not require the same institutions that
disclosure regulation does. As a corollary, the relevant game models for
such areas would also be different from the Prisoners' Dilemma. Should
112. Joan E. Spero, Guiding Global Finance, 73 FOREIGN POL'Y 114, 124 (Winter 1988-
1989). For more details about IOSCO's activities, see A.A. Sommer, Jr., JOSCO- Its Mission and
Achievement, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 15 (1996).
113. Note that I do not argue that IOSCO has failed. What is being explored in the text is the
reasons for IOSCO's divergence from the textbook solution for overcoming a Prisoners' Dilemma-like
problem, i.e., establishing a strong centralized institution.
114. Compare TAYLOR, supra note 91. The argument advanced in this Article is broader than
Taylor's. While Taylor argues that public good problems may be modeled by 2x2 games other than
the Prisoners' Dilemma, I argue that problems of international securities regulation may not involve
public good problems to begin with and, afortiori, need not be modeled as a Prisoners' Dilemma.
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IOSCO prove successful in more limited projects, it may gather the required
stature and authority to allow it to deal with the more intractable problems.
This could proceed according to a GATT-like scenario of gradual progress
over time, possibly in several rounds.
b. Relative Gains Games
Occasionally, states are concerned with their rank as much as with
their absolute payoffs. Such is the case with respect to the United States's
position in the global securities market with which many Americans are
increasingly concerned.115 Consequently, a game like Prisoners' Dilemma,
which originally had a Pareto-superior cooperative outcome, becomes a
zero-sum game, since in such tugs-of-war what one state gains its rival
loses. In the extreme, the 2x2 game model transforms as shown in Figure
2.116 Since one state is by definition better off when its rival is worse off, the
CC outcome is superior for one state while it is inferior for the other, and
vice versa for DD.








D* 4, 1 or
2, 3**
Payoffs to (Row, Column)
Cell numerals refer to each player's ordinally ranked payoffs.Player's dominant strategy
Equilibrium outcome
The relative gains version of the game resembles the Prisoners'
Dilemma in that in both games the players have a dominant strategy to
defect, leading to a Nash equilibrium in DD. However, the equilibrium that
emerges in DD is worse than the DD outcome in the original Prisoners'
115. See the discussion in Section II.B, infra.
116. See STEIN, supra note 39, at 127.
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Dilemma. While the latter might cause the players to look for a payoff-
increasing cooperative arrangement, the former suppresses any common
interest in achieving a mutually more desirable outcome since such an
outcome does not exist.
Whether such games leave room for cooperation is not fully
resolved." 7 Real-life situations do not exhibit pure forms of competitive
games of this sort; for instance, descending in rank while gaining enormous
absolute gains might often seem a reasonable compromise. Also, losing
place number eight to become number ten is not equivalent to losing place
number one to become number three. The severity of the model's outcome is
not frequently encountered. However, once a state does adopt a competitive
attitude toward its goals in the international arena, it should bear in mind the
more conflictual nature its international relations will acquire and the less
cooperation it will be able to achieve. Nevertheless, relativistic viewpoints
and rank-seeking are often deeply embedded in states' traditions and
cultures. Alternatively, such viewpoints and behavior may stem from a state
seeking market power. It follows that to the extent that the United States
keeps emphasizing a leadership role in the securities market it may impede
reaching cooperation in Prisoners' Dilemma-like issues.
c. Asymmetric States-Hegemonic Stability Games
Consider a case with a large asymmetry between the two player-states.
One player, Row, is a world economic power with a deep and liquid market
and a reputation of having a stringent securities regulation system. The other
player, Column, has a small economy with a relatively illiquid market and
no tradition of securities regulation. For various reasons, large offerings by
companies from Column that cannot be accomplished entirely in its market
are also carried out in Row's larger market. While Row prefers Column to
establish a disclosure regime at least as demanding as its own, it will
maintain its stringent regime even in the face of Column's defection. Row's
payoff structure is represented by the preference order CC > CD > DC >
DD. Column's preferences are different: while it sees the potential value of
disclosure, it is less enthusiastic to establish a stringent regime immediately.
117. This issue is subject to a lively debate in the international relations scholarship. See
generally STEIN, supra note 39, ch. 5. Joseph Grieco expresses the prominent Realist position that
doubts any possibility for cooperation in a competitive game. See Grieco, supra note 43. Stein
provides a static 2x2 model in which under certain conditions cooperation may emerge. See STEIN,
supra note 39, at 146. Snidal, in a dynamic multi-player model, shows that as the number of states
increases the impact of relative gains diminishes. See Duncan Snidal, Relative Gains and the Pattern
of International Cooperation, 85 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 701 (1991). A fierce exchange ensued. See
Joseph M. Grieco, The Relative-Gains Problem for International Cooperation: Comment, 87 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 729, 735-42 (1993); see also Robert J. Franzese, Jr. & Michael Hiscox, Bargains,
Games, and Relative Gains: Positional Concerns and International Cooperation, Working Paper No.
95-4, Harvard Univ., Department of Government (1995) (arguing that while the relative gains
problem can hinder cooperation in international relations, it does so only under specific conditions).
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Instead, it prefers to rely on Row's regime and impose laxer requirements at
home. Its preference order is thus DC > CC > DD > CD, and the
corresponding game is shown in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3. HEGEMONIC STABILITY GAME
Column
C D*
4, 3 3, 4**
C*
Row
D 2, 1 1,2
Payoffs to (Row, Column)
Cell numerals refer to each player's ordinally ranked payoffs.
" Player's dominant strategy
Equilibrium outcome
In the international relations terminology the game involves a regime
of hegemonic stability. '18 Both players have a dominant strategy, and the
equilibrium outcome of the game for Row and Column is CD,
respectively.119 The hegemon (Row) is dissatisfied with this outcome in
which Column free rides its legal regime but still prefers it to playing D,
i.e., lowering its disclosure standards.
A perception that the game being played involves hegemony would
probably entail a sense of a relative gains game as well. Thus, if a state's
regulators perceive their country as a de facto hegemon, they might adopt
the corollary perception and strive to preserve it. The United States again
provides a good example. 2° As already mentioned, one can find
intermingled expressions of both perceptions in the context of U.S.
118. See ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DiscoRD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 31-39 (1984).
119. Column's third and fourth preferences are not decisive for an equilibrium. Even if
Column preferred CD > DD, an equilibrium could be established in (Row cooperate, Column
defect), albeit without a dominant strategy for Column. Such a scenario, however, is hard to support
with a plausible story.
120. See Edward G. Greene et al., Hegemony or Deference: U.S. Disclosure Requirements in
the International Capital Markets, 50 Bus. LAW. 413, 413 (1995). Query, however, whether a
genuine hegemon exists in the global securities market.
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international securities regulation policy. The common theme is that the
United States has the largest, most efficient, and most demanding market in
the world, and therefore it has to find a way to preserve its position while
leading the way in standard setting.'2'
On the other hand, the equilibrium in this game leaves the hegemon
with its second-best outcome, while the other player-state gets its first-best
outcome. The hegemon thus could have a greater positive impact on the
other's returns than on its own. In other words, the hegemon's strategy
improves its absolute position, but over time its relative position will
deteriorate. For this reason, the problem has been named "the hegemon's
dilemma."' This phenomenon explains another facet of general American
policy in international securities regulation: the demand to ensure a "level
playing field" for its issuers.
Hegemony and cooperation may come hand in hand when the hegemon
opts to change its rivals' payoff structure through issue linkage or side
payments (or threats). Such non-public-good transactions help both sides to
ensure the provision of the public good.' 3 Lisa Martin dubbed this kind of
asymmetric situation a Suasion game, since the dilemma facing the hegemon
is to persuade or coerce others to cooperate. 24
The MJDS system demonstrates the SEC's hegemonic behavior. The
MJDS system purports to implement mutual recognition of financial
reporting in the United States and three Canadian provinces.' 25 Canada is the
largest supplier of foreign listings to the United States, has close economic
relations with it, and in general shares the same business tradition.
Nevertheless, negotiations on MJDS were protracted, causing the United
Kingdom (that originally took part in the project) eventually to drop out. The
final outcome is far from implementing mutual recognition. Due to the
SEC's insistence, Canadian companies reporting under the MJDS have to
reconcile their statements to meet a series of American reporting
requirements and be subject to American liability rules. It was further
argued that the MJDS caused the Canadian securities regulation regime to
shift toward that of the United States.'26 In the MJDS case the SEC thus
behaved as a hegemon by using its power position as the regulator of the
121. See SEC, Policy Statement, supra note 24, 84,341. Doty also reflects this mix of
hegemony and relative position concerns. See Doty, supra note 25, at S50. Most telling, however, is
the title of the SEC's report to Congress on the progress of IOSCO toward a harmonized disclosure
system for transnational offerings. See SEC, supra note 104, at 17.3.3.
122. Arthur S. Stein, The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the
International Economic Order, 38 INT'L ORG. 355, 384 (1984).
123. See KEOHANE, supra note 118, at 51, 91-92.
124. See Martin, supra note 52, at 777-80.
125. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and
Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 6902, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036 (July
1, 1991).
126. See Calley Jordan, Regulation of Canadian Capital Markets in the 1990s: The United
States in the Driver's Seat, 4 PAc. RiM L. & POL'Y J. 577, 589-95 (1995).
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coveted U.S. market. Such behavior, however, is not always feasible for
political or other reasons-something that may force a state to resort to
alternative avenues such as using international institutions.
While a hegemon can transact directly with its rival and spare the use
of international institutions, organizations like IOSCO may still facilitate
cooperation by offering opportunities for issue linkage and by helping the
smaller player to save face domestically. Thus, it may be considered more
respectable to yield to IOSCO than to the SEC. So far, the SEC has used
IOSCO strategically in this manner in the field of disclosure, while adopting
a very confrontational stance. Less confrontational maneuvering seems to
have happened in other fields-particularly with respect to insider trading-
as I argue in more detail below.'27
The SEC's recent dealing with the IOSCO/IASC project of disclosure
rules also reflects a case of hegemonic coercion rather than suasion. As the
project gets closer to fruition, the SEC is flexing its hegemonic muscles to
make sure that the chosen standards do not deviate from the Commission's
regulatory position. In doing so, the SEC relies on the U.S. market power in
order to establish the standards it deems fit. 2 ' That the United States,
through the SEC, is behaving hegemonically is underscored by the fact that
no consensus exists even within the United States as to the merits or exact
form of disclosure about financial instrument risk. By confronting the
IOSCO/ASC, the SEC saves itself and its foreign counterparts the need to
confront directly with one another. At the same time, the SEC has been
narrowing the gaps between the American standards and the proposed IAS,
thus ensuring that foreign disclosure regimes do not deviate too much from
the American one (assuming plausibly that most countries will adopt IAS).
3. A Note on Accounting Standards
This Subsection continues the exploration of disclosure regulation and
the search for models that could help explain the extant international regime
in this field. As noted above, the standard economic analyses of domestic
disclosure regulation and certain features of international interaction between
national securities regulators indicate the Prisoners' Dilemma as the
appropriate baseline model. The previous Subsection then adds differences
in size and in perception of the game as additional factors and discusses the
correlated game models. In what follows, I deal with the effects of setting
127. See infra Section LV.C.
128. A similar episode of a clash between IOSCO and the SEC over particular standards took
place in the early 1990s with regard to capital adequacy standards. See PORTER, supra note 35, at
118-19; Sommer, supra note 112, 19-20. The SEC's refusal to endorse the standards proposed by
IOSCO has harmed the organization severely.
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disclosure rules through accounting standards. This process-again, in its
pure form-is best modeled by yet another 2x2 game, a point that sheds light
on some questions left open with regard to IOSCO.
a. The Double Role of Accounting Standards
"Disclosure rules" and "accounting standards" are often used
interchangeably, perhaps because in determining the actual content of
disclosure, regulators usually defer to standards set by professional
accounting bodies. The SEC, for example, has the authority to supervise the
setting of accounting standards for disclosure by public companies but
prefers to have them set by a professional body-the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB).' 29 In any event, it should be noted that accounting
standards play a double role in financial reporting. One role is to determine
what should be reported. For example, hidden reserves, which enable
management to shift profits from good years to bad ones, are allowed by
German generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) but are strictly
forbidden by U.S. GAAP. The second role is to determine how to disclose,
or present, such information: methods of reporting inventory, sums
denominated in foreign currency, and adjustment for inflationary effects are
but a few examples.
The need for uniform presentation rules may be called into question in
light of empirical evidence that changes in the presentation of financial data
do not affect the value of the disclosing company's securities. Such changes,
it is said, cannot fool the market."'3 A question thus arises as to whether any
presentation standards are required at all or, more precisely, whether any
resources should be invested in harmonizing presentation standards. These
empirical results are strongly connected to the Efficient Capital Market
Hypothesis and are ordinarily brought as evidence of market efficiency."'
129. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229 (1995), and particularly item 302 thereof are the
central source for this regulation by reference under the American integrated disclosure system. For a
recent review of FASB's role and its relations with the SEC, see Martin Mayer, FASB on Trial,
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Nov. 1997, at 78. The SEC's main concern with regard to FASB in the last
few years has been to ensure the independence of its standard setters (the trustees). See Paula Dwyer,
Hardball at the SEC, Bus. wK., Sept. 29, 1997, at 50.
130. See Robert K. Eskew & William F. Wright, An Empirical Analysis of Differential
Capital Market Reactions to Extraordinary Accounting Items, 31 J. FIN. 651, 673 (1976); Robert S.
Kaplan & Richard Roll, Investor Evaluation of Accounting Information: Some Empirical Evidence, 45
J. Bus. 225, 227 (1972); see also Claire A. Hill, Why Financial Appearances Might Matter: An
Erplanation for "Dirty Pooling" and Some Other Types of Financial Cosmetics, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L.
141, 145 (1997) (arguing that markets react neutrally to financial cosmetics so long as they are
"tastefully applied").
131. For the purposes of the arguments presented in the text there is no need to elaborate on
various possible forms of market informational efficiencies (the strong, semi-strong, and weak forms).
However, the semi-strong form is the relevant one for practical aspects. Semi-strong efficiency occurs
when security prices reflect all publicly available information. See Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (defining the three
forms of informational efficiency).
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But a closer look, however, reveals that the argument actually cuts both
ways, the reverse argument being that when markets are efficient we would
expect them not to be sensitive to the choice of accounting standards. Seen
this way, the argument means that for markets that are not entirely efficient,
accounting rules may be relevant, in the sense that their choice may affect
prices. Consequently, the value of harmonizing these rules in order to avoid
unsubstantiated variance (noise) in prices becomes evident.
Harmonizing presentation rules may be important even in efficient
markets, for reasons of transaction costs reduction. Market efficiency is
costly to achieve and is the product of a wide array of factors. The
mechanisms of market efficiency-that is, various forms of informed
trading-are driven by actual traders.132 These traders include professionally
informed traders, such as arbitrageurs, researchers, brokers, and portfolio
managers, "who devote their careers to acquiring information and honing
evaluative skills."133 Reducing the costs to these market professionals of
becoming informed by eliminating the need to translate financial data from
one format to another (reconciliation), and thus eliminating possible errors
during the translation, will improve market efficiency and therefore warrants
the effort for coordination.1
34
The presentation role of accounting standards thus may be as important
as their substantive one. Consistency in presentation, namely, a rule that
requires companies to utilize the same accounting method consistently over
time, would prevent management from shifting among alternative methods
to the one most favorable to them. In this, they are equivalent to substantive
rules and may invoke the same Prisoners' Dilemma problem. In addition,
presentation rules are essential for comparability, that is, to allow investors
to compare alternative securities. Finally, uniform presentation standards,
like other standards, create positive network externalities by creating a
common business language. Thus, they lower transaction costs and the noise
in securities prices.
132. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REv. 549, 569-72 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets,
Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 786-96 (1985); Sanford J.
Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM.
ECON. REv. 393, 393 (1980).
133. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 132, at 571.
134. See FREDERICK D.S. CHoI & RICHARD M. LEVICH, THE CAPITAL MARKET EFFECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING DIvERsrTY 3-5 (1990). But see Ravi Bhushan & Donald R. Lessard,
Coping with International Accounting Diversity: Fund Managers' Vews on Disclosure,
Reconciliation, and Harmonization, 4 J. INT'L FIN. MGMT. & ACCT. 149, 151 (1992) (disputing the
relationship between the costs of standards and the overall quality of information available).
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b. Sources of International Diversity
While substantive disclosure rules may originate from national policies
or other fundamental economic reasons, there is little reason to assume that
this is also the case with respect to presentation rules. In fact, such rules are
by definition divorced from substantive purposes. Yet this does not mean
that countries do not have any interest in their related presentation
accounting standards. We would usually expect presentation rules to
originate from traditional conventions that were developed and adapted over
time to meet modern needs.
Once a country's accounting profession adopts certain presentation
conventions, human and other forms of capital start to accumulate in, for
example, acquired skills and education systems. Indeed, standards in general
present the most striking examples of human capital that users are extremely
reluctant to scuttle by migrating to another standard, even if the latter is
easier to use or more efficient."3 5 In the international context, standards have
not escaped that fate. Conflicts among states about standards are common
and are often a source of tension. 136
c. The Correlated Game and International Cooperation
Conflicts among states about standards are commonly modeled by the
game Battle of the Sexes.137 They are generally called "coordination games,"
as opposed to "collaboration games," of which the Prisoners' Dilemma is
the quintessential example." 8 In a Battle of the Sexes game each player tries
to achieve a double goal. One goal is for both players to play the same
strategy, either CC or DD. In fact, both CC and DD are cooperative to the
same degree, so D should not be considered "defection." A second goal is
for both players to play his or her preferred strategy, over which they differ.
A possible preference order for a coordination game is CC > DD > CD >
DC for Row and DD > CC > DC > CD for Column. 39 Figure 4 presents
the game in its strategic form.
135. The QWERTY keyboard is a famous example. See Paul A. David, Clio and the
Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REv. 332, 335 (1985); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E.
Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J. L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1990).
136. See, e.g., Krasner, supra note 30, at 342-44 (discussing the evolution of
communications standards as a coordination game).
137. The story that is usually told with regard to the game's name is of a man and a woman
who consider their entertainment plans for the evening. While one of them wants very much to go to a
prize fight, the other strongly prefers the ballet. Each of them, however, would forgo his or her first-
best preference in favor of the other's, to avoid going out alone.
138. See Snidal, supra note 46.
139. The preference order and the payoff structure do not have to be symmetrical with
respect to the two most right-hand side terms.
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FIGURE 4. BATTLE OF THE SEXES
Column
C D
C 4, 3** 2, 2
Row
D 1, 1 3, 4**
Payoffs to (Row, Column)
Cell numerals refer to each player's ordinally ranked payoffs.
* Player's dominant strategy
Equilibrium outcome
In this game, neither player has a dominant strategy, i.e., neither can
choose its policy without knowing what the other player's policy choice is.
The game has two Nash equilibria, in CC and DD: once both players choose
C or D, they have no incentive to change their choice. Specifically, once the
accounting industries in two countries agree on certain presentation
standards, they have good reasons to adhere to them and no reason to change
them unilaterally. Therefore, there is no compelling need for any strong
enforcement mechanism, because once an agreement is reached, it is self-
enforcing.
States, however, still face the problem of reaching any agreement. In
the game form presented in Figure 4, because of the ordinal payoff
structures, there is no way to know in advance which of the two possible
equilibria would result. A specific outcome may be induced by making one
of the two equilibria a focal point, for instance, by converging to the largest
state's accounting standards. In certain countries, however, taking such a
course of action might be interpreted by interested parties as succumbing to
foreign dictates. States that take pride in their tradition would thus be
discouraged from replacing their accounting standards with those of another
state's, unless those standards are clearly superior (which would not be the
case, generally). 40
140. Similarly, where the decision-making process on the issue is captured (or heavily
influenced) by the interested industry, one could expect strong opposition to changes that would
render human and physical capital worthless.
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An alternative way to reach an agreement in a coordination problem is
to turn to international organizations such as ISAC or IOSCO that can
provide face-saving as well as dissemination of information among the
member states. Such an institution can facilitate changes in a multilateral
form by reducing transactions costs. 141 However, we would expect such
international institutions to be relatively weak, lacking rule-making authority
and dispute resolution fora. IOSCO, indeed, confirms this expectation, since
it mainly operates as a discussion-facilitating forum and has no enforcement
powers.
In fact, one can identify a dual mechanism of coordination in this
particular context: national securities regulators turn to IOSCO for resolving
the problem and IOSCO, in turn, refers the problem to IASC-in itself a
very weak institution. In this setting, both institutions reinforce one another
in providing the focal point for agreement in a coordination problem.
IOSCO benefits from the professional reputation of IASC that lends
authority to its rules (while diminishing its direct responsibility to their
actual content), and IASC benefits reputationally from the unique
imprimatur given to its work by IOSCO. Thus, both institutions benefit from
their role in terms of reputation and power in the future. The SEC's
objection to the standards demonstrates the flip side-that when substantive
accounting standards are at issue, cooperation is much harder to achieve.' 42
B. Antifraud Regulation
Transnational securities fraud has many faces. In essence, it relates to
any fraudulent conduct with significant elements located in different
countries. The transnational quality may relate to different kinds of
elements, as is the case when the shareholders are located in one country and
the misrepresentation is carried out in another; or it may relate to the same
element, when, for example, defrauded shareholders are dispersed in several
countries, securities are traded in several markets, or the misrepresentation
spans across state borders. A commonly discussed problem is: When should
one country assert its jurisdiction extraterritorially-that is, unilaterally-on
the case?'43 This Article does not deal with this issue, although it shares the
observation made in such discussions that not all countries will always
pursue wrongdoers with the same vigor. The question asked here is
different, namely: When would two countries' cooperate in pursuing
wrongdoers?
141. See John G. Ruggie, Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution, 46 INT'L ORG. 561,
576-78 (1992) (describing international telecommunication institutions in nineteenth-century Europe).
142. For an alternative analysis of the setting of accounting standards, see Paul J. M.
Klumpes, Competition Among Accounting Standard Setters: A Property Rights Analysis, Working
Paper No. 98/007, The Management School, Lancaster University (1998). Klumpes, however,
assumes IOSCO to be much stronger an institution than it really is.
143. See supra Sections ll.A, ll.B.
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1. Sources of International Diversity
International cooperation is defined in terms of conscious policy
coordination among states.' When antifraud regulation is at issue, the task
of policy coordination is easiest since, presumably, most modem societies
condemn fraud. While some cultures are more tolerant of lying than
others,'45 I believe we would find less variance among nations when the
additional legal elements that constitute fraud-reliance, damage, and causal
connection-are present. It seems that there are relatively fewer cultural
differences with regard to fraud, so that a consensus exists that fraud is
undesirable. Given this consensus, what are the possible sources of
international diversity with regard to antifraud regulation?
In general, we would expect differences among countries to appear as
we depart from the "core," common-law-like notion of fraud. The following
paragraphs sketch several bases for diversity among countries in antifraud
regulation (although some of them apply to other securities regulation issues
as well).
First, diversity may stem from benign differences in legal concepts
applicable to securities fraud. An example of such a specific concept is the
definition of "prospectus." 46 Different legal systems may have various
methods of defining a prospectus even if all of them refer to the same
generic document. Although most lawyers would opine that a prospectus is a
major document in a public offering, a striking demonstration of a different
interpretation was provided by U.S. law. Due to the statutory structure of
the Securities Act of 1933 and subsequent case law, it had become possible
to argue that "prospectus" included documents that were part of a purely
private securities transaction. After a long period of controversy and
uncertainty,'4 7 a Supreme Court decision was required (not without a strong
dissent) to clarify that this interpretation was wrong. 4' Clearly, the
implications for what is subject to administrative enforcement and
monitoring are vast. A more general example relates to liability formulas,
i.e., to the elements that require proof in order to establish liability. These
144. See Oye, supra note 38, at 6.
145. See RONALD INGLEHART ET AL., HUMAN VALUES AND BELIEFS: A CROSS-CULTURAL
SOURCE BooK 54, tbl.V303 (1998) (reporting considerable national diversity in people's attitudes
towards lying in one's own interest).
146. Some may prefer to relate to "prospectus" as a technical term rather than as a concept.
The distinction is a matter of taste, with no effect on the centrality of prospectuses in any securities
regulation regime.
147. See Welcome to the Post-Gustafson Era, EUROMONEY, July 1995, at 113.
148. See Gustafson v. Alloyd, Inc. 513 U.S. 561, 569-70 (1995). But see id. at 584, 585
(Thomas, J. dissenting) (interpreting the Securities Act to allow "prospectus" to cover both private
and public securities transactions).
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include the mental element, and the definition of "fraudulent" or
"misleading."
Second, differences in the structure of the securities market may entail
differences in the regulatory attitude toward fraud. Modem securities
markets pose a hurdle to the classical fraud formula due to the absence, in
practically all cases, of reliance on the alleged misrepresentation. The
United States solved the problem with the "fraud on the market" doctrine,
which allows the plaintiff to satisfy the reliance requirement in a fraud suit
by showing that she bought or sold her shares in a semi-strong efficient
market.'49 Such a demonstration is relatively easy in the United States with
respect to a certain category of securities for which a sufficient float exists
and that are closely followed by financial analysts. In many other countries
such showing is virtually impossible, as these conditions are absent.
Consequently, public representations that could substantiate liability in the
United States might not suffice in other countries, and thus alternative
solutions must be sought.
Third, differences in regulatory competence also entail de facto gaps in
antifraud regulation. Since fraud is more accepted as mala per se, it is less
likely to serve as a subsidy mechanism than lenient disclosure rules or
capital requirements. Yet different monitoring and enforcement capabilities
will nonetheless create such differences. Consequently, fraud may be more
prevalent in one country than in another notwithstanding similar legal
attitudes.
The argument that states would normally gain little from tolerating
securities fraud indeed revolves around the assumption that fraud is accepted
as a mala per se and is less likely to serve as a subsidy mechanism. In
economic terms, the convention that "fraud is bad" means that for most
societies allowing transnational fraud would internalize the effects of lenient
regulation.' Cooperation in fraud prevention would enhance the gains for
both states and improve their position. Put differently, there are no interstate
externalities (from failing to punish transnational swindlers) that would
motivate one state to tolerate fraud toward its sister states, and we therefore
should not expect competition or a "race to the bottom" in international
antifraud regulation to develop.
One could still argue that states may attribute different levels of
severity to domestic or inbound fraud (fraud among or against their citizens)
and to outbound fraud that has no direct effect on local markets. Thus, a
state could enrich itself by allowing its citizens to defraud the rest of the
149. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-47 (1988); see also Ian Ayres, Back to
Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 VA. L. REv. 945 (1991); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-
Market-Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 1059 (1990).
150. The possible reasons for such internalization could be both ethical and practical. A
nation can perceive fraud as a moral wrong such that the national identity of the victims matters less,
or the nation can be concerned that its reputation might get tarnished.
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world. The argument is not so far-fetched. In the United States, some
federal courts condemn the idea of leniency toward outbound securities fraud
(for purposes of extraterritorial jurisdiction). A possible reasoning for such a
rule, as indicated above, would be that such fraudulent conduct will
adversely affect that country itself, through the corruption of morals. One
court thus declared that, "[w]e do not think Congress intended to allow the
United States to be used as a base for manufacturing fraudulent securities
devices for export, even when these are peddled only to foreigners."' 5
Persuasive as it may sound, other federal courts find this proposition
too expansive, and prefer more restraint in such cases.'52 This might lead
one to realize that some outward-facing fraudulent conduct may be
considered more lightly than comparable inward-facing fraud. An example is
the case of transnational bribery by multinational corporations which,
strangely enough, found its way into the Securities Acts.'53
It is well-known that bribery is still embedded in the "administrative
culture" of certain countries. Precedents include less developed states as
well as developed countries such as Italy and Japan. Multinational
corporations (MNCs) that seek business in such countries often have to pay
bribes to officials and other office holders as a matter of course, even if such
conduct is outright prohibited in their home country. Some of the largest
American MNCs have been found to engage in such conduct, and the parties
receiving bribes have included prime ministers and other top officials. The
ensuing scandals led to the enactment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA),"' which is embodied primarily in Section 30A of the Securities
Exchange Act. It prohibits issuers and other companies subject to the
reporting duties of the Securities Acts from bribing foreign officials or
political parties in order to obtain or retain business.
Notwithstanding the FCPA's noble cause, other countries were
reluctant to enact similar laws despite strict prohibitions on domestic
bribery. In fact, for two decades after the enactment of the FCPA, the
United States remained the sole country proscribing outbound transnational
bribery. The situation placed American-based MNCs between a rock and a
hard place, putting them at a clear disadvantage relative to non-U.S.
MNCs.'55 Several attempts to achieve or broker a multilateral agreement to
151. ]IT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975). In my opinion, this forceful
proposition also undermines some proposals for jurisdictional rules that are based solely on
shareholders' nationality, which are discussed in Section II.B., supra.
152. See generally Cox ET AL., supra note 15, at 1356-63 (reviewing the cases).
153. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1994).
154. Id.
155. For discussions see Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. Rv. 229, 254-57 (1997); Daniel Pines,
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ban that conduct, including some sponsored by the United Nations and the
OECD, have all failed. Only in November 1997 was a treaty signed by
twenty-nine OECD members to outlaw the practice of bribing foreign
government officials. 5' This treaty is primarily a moral victory for the
United States since the signatories stopped short of agreeing to criminalize
the conduct. In addition, certain countries, including France and Germany,
allow their firms to deduct overseas bribes from their taxes as legitimate
business expenses.'57 The lesson to take home from the bribery example is
that countries might differ over the condemnability of certain conduct and,
even though they reach consensus on this point, they may still differ over its
extraterritorial application.'
2. The Correlated Games and International Cooperation
a. A Harmony Game
The case of international antifraud regulation is instructive because it
demonstrates that in certain cases, states' independent interests do not clash,
but rather may converge. The correlated 2x2 game is mainly one of
Harmony, i.e., one in which "actors' policies (pursued in their own self-
interest without regard for others) automatically facilitate the attainment of
others' goals." 59 Such a policy can be summarized in the following
preference order: CC > CD > DC > DD. In general, the payoff structure
reflects a policy of "the more, the better," i.e., an interest in having as
Note, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L.
REv. 185, 208-10 (1994).
156. See Edmund L. Andrews, 29 Nations Agree to Outlaw Bribing Foreign Officials, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1997, at Al; see also Paul Lewis, Straining Toward an Agreement on Global
Bribery Club, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1997, at D4 (describing the difficulties in reaching a
transnational antibribery agreement).
157. See Progress Against Bribery, INT'L HERALD TRm., Dec. 2, 1997, at 8.
158. Another example of different stances toward domestic and outbound conduct is the case
of cartels. In many of the advanced market economies, cartelization is perhaps the gravest offense in
antitrust/competition law. For example, in the United States, conduct such as price fixing and
territorial allocations is subject to a per se illegality doctrine. In other words, it comes closest to mala
per se conduct. Nevertheless, export cartels-cartels whose anti-competitive effects are felt abroad-
are exempted from the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), and are exempted from prohibition in the
United States under both the Webb-Pomerence Act of 1918, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1994), and the
Export Trading Company Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1994). The situation is similar in
other countries. See F.M. SCHERER, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY
43-52 (1994). Efforts to reach an international treaty banning even this seemingly universally-
censured conduct have so far failed, and prominent antitrust scholars acknowledge the difficulties of
and slim prospects for reaching such an agreement. For representative opinions, see Eleanor M. Fox,
Toward World Antitrust and Market Access, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1997); Spencer Weber Waller, The
Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. Rv. 343 (1997); Diane P. Wood, The
Internationalization of Antitrust Law: Options for the Future, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1289 (1994). One
may suspect, however, that the general stance toward cartelization is not as hostile as it is in the
United States and in the EU.
159. KEOHANE, supra note 118, at 51; see also STEIN, supra note 39, at 29-30; Oye, supra
note 38, at 7.
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much antifraud activity as possible. Figure 5 presents the game in the
strategic form.
FIGURE 5. HARMONY GAME
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In Harmony, both players have a dominant strategy to play C, so the
equilibrium outcome is CC, which is also the Pareto-efficient outcome. In
fact, one may distinguish between "playing C" in the Harmony game and
"cooperation," where cooperation requires that the actions of parties-which
are not in preexistent harmony-be brought into conformity with one another
through negotiation."6 In its pure form, Harmony does not call for any
cooperation in the sense of conscious policy coordination, as the players
independently converge to the desired CC outcome.
The argument that the game being played in antifraud regulation is
Harmony receives support from the growing number of MOUs between
securities regulators around the world."' Typically, an MOU would provide
for mutual assistance in investigations and confidentiality of records. 62 By
160. See KEOHANE, supra note 118, at 51.
161. An updated list of MOUs can be found on IOSCO's website, <http://www.iosco.org>.
An Index of Memoranda of Understanding and Similar Agreements Between IOSCO Members (visited
Oct. 30, 1998) <http:lwww.iosco.orgliosco.html>.
162. For an extensive overview of MOUs and other cooperative measures, see Mann et al.,
International Agreements, supra note 25, at 795-818. See also Doty, supra note 25, 316-21
(discussing MOUs); Paul G. Mahoney, Securities Regulation by Enforcement: An International
Perspective, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 305, 312-14 (1990) (discussing SEC efforts to promote American-
style regulation abroad); Mann et al., International Mechanisms, supra note 25, 316-21 (discussing
MOUs); Millspaugh & Belt, supra note 62, at 376-79 (describing MOUs and treaties); James A.
Kehoe, Note, Exporting Insider Trading Laws: The Enforcement of U.S. Insider Trading Laws
1999)
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signing such an MOU, a securities regulation agency indicates to its
colleague agency that it shares the same values and would not consider the
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction as an encroachment on its
authority.163 The SEC has been the leading agency in terms of the number of
MOUs and the impetus to sign them; MOUs reached by the SEC essentially
facilitate the extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws.
A significant feature of the mutual assistance MOUs is the fact that
they are bilateral. As a rule, one cannot find multilateral agreements among
them, and, moreover, we do not observe an international institution that
oversees these agreements, enforces them, or plays a crucial role in
brokering them."6 This is an indication that there is no demand for a
centralized international regime of cooperation in antifraud regulation.'65 In
other words, there are few, if any, hurdles to overcome that warrant the
investment in a multilateral arrangement.
Further evidence as to the game being played is provided by the issues
covered in a typical MOU. Their nature is probably best summarized in the
language of the SEC staff members: "MOUs generally are non-binding
arrangements between like-minded regulators."' 66 MOUs are non-binding,
declaratory statements of intent, exhibiting similar conceptual ideas
concerning what constitutes securities violation and what areas should be
regulated by securities laws. MOUs call for information exchange and
mutual cooperation in investigations of securities violations. 67 It is thus not
surprising that in the European Union MOUs are virtually absent. The
situation is best explained by the fact that all the major directives on
securities regulation provide for information exchange among regulatory
authorities, and that, these directives, moreover, are in essence joint
declarations of regulatory policy and minimum standards. They thus make
the signing of specific MOUs cost-ineffective, if not redundant, as these
would be the primary roles of an MOU.16
Finally, consider the nature of the signatories to the MOUs, which are
the securities commissions rather than the states themselves. Since the
Internationally, 9 EMORY INT'L L. Rv. 345, 359-69 (1995) (describing MOUs and treaties).
163. Cf. Pines, supra note 155, 205-07 (arguing that since the FCPA embodies universal
values, other countries should welcome its extraterritorial application). As the main text indicates, the
case is probably more problematic than Pines suggests.
164. With respect to MOUs, IOSCO serves primarily as a depository for signed MOUs and
as a source of a model MOU standardized text. For a discussion of the latter role, see infra text
accompanying notes 211-213. These roles, however, do not suffice to create a strong centralized
regime when one is necessary.
165. Cf. Robert 0. Keohane, The Demand for International Regimes, 36 INT'L ORG. 325,
326-27 (1982) (arguing that demand for international regimes is dependent on a number of conditions
and not a "given").
166. Mann et al., International Agreements, supra note 25, at 796.
167. See id; Kehoe, supra note 162, at 359.
168. See Amir N. Licht, Stock Market Integration in Europe, CAER II Discussion Paper No.
15, Harvard Inst. for Int'l Dev., at 36-37 (1998), available in
<http://www.hiid.harvard.edu/projects/caer/pubs.html >.
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parties' interests are harmonious, there is no need for any binding covenants
that would derogate from the states' sovereignty by limiting their freedom of
action. Had the problem been one that required states to forego options that
could otherwise have been in their interest (as is the case in international
trade), a full-fledged international treaty between them would have been
necessary.169 From the fact that a non-binding arrangement is sufficient one
may conclude that the parties' interests are generally harmonious.
In the aggregate, therefore, this evidence supports the claim that
international antifraud regulation is a Harmony game. It follows that
analyses of international securities regulation that are based solely on a race-
to-the-bottom or regulatory-competition reasoning may be inappropriate in
this specific context. 7 ' At the same time, one should be careful not to draw
general lessons hastily from the growing number of bilateral MOUs. These
MOUs, while encouraging, do not necessarily mean that agreement on
other, more conflictual, issues can be readily achieved.
b. A Stag Hunt Game
The very existence of the MOUs is still disturbing. If the game being
played in antifraud regulation is purely Harmony, then the Pareto-efficient
outcome should occur spontaneously as the product of each state's egoistic
choice alone. Therefore, the transaction costs borne by the parties in
reaching these agreements call for explanation. Moreover, if this condition
were the case, states would not be so sensitive to the extraterritorial
application of foreign laws to their residents, and states would, be less
reluctant to assert jurisdiction extraterritorially.
One possible answer may be that some states play for a positional good
as depicted in Figure 2. In such a case, the utility from doing the right thing
may be offset by the disutility from losing rank in the international securities
market. In fact, the SEC has been applying a policy of lower disclosure
standards for foreign issuers exactly under this reasoning.' 7' Translating such
169. MOUs are sometimes supplemented by mutual legal assistance treaties. These
documents are fully binding international treaties between the signatory states that provide for various
forms of assistance in information gathering. Assistance under such treaties is usually conditioned on
"double criminality" of the relevant conduct under both states' laws-when harmonious interests are
ensured. See, e.g., Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters between the Swiss Confederation
and the United States, May 25, 1973, U.S.-Switz., 29 U.S.T. 2019. These agreements formerly were
invoked especially in connection with international insider trading cases.
170. Some international relations scholars have indeed argued that international relations
studies are preoccupied with conflictual game models, such as Prisoners' Dilemma, Chicken, and Stag
Hunt, and that such studies all too often ignore the more straightforward explanations for cooperation
and conflict, as modeled by Harmony and Deadlock (the absence of any mutual interest), respectively.
See Oye, supra note 38, at 7.
171. See supra note 20.
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a policy to the field of antifraud would mean a more tolerant attitude toward
fraud in general than is evidently the case in the United States.
An alternative explanation may be that, with regard to antifraud
regulation, states do employ a double standard for inbound and outbound
fraud. As mentioned above," some federal courts in effect implement such
a standard by restricting the extraterritorial application of American
securities laws. By signing an MOU, securities regulators can ensure that
inbound transnational fraud is curbed by their colleagues to the same degree
as outbound fraud.
A third alternative may be that the universal view of fraud assumed
heretofore, namely, that "fraud is bad," does not always hold in reality.
Such would be the case if one state strove to ban a certain conduct, which it
deems fraudulent, while others were still hesitant, not fully convinced that it
was fraud. Thinking that "they call it 'fraud', but it's really not that bad," a
commissioner might allocate her limited budget and staff to other purposes.
In this situation both players will demand assurances that their rival sees eye
to eye with them, assurances concretized in a document such as an MOU.
The game Stag Hunt better models the scenarios portrayed in the last
two alternatives. In Stag Hunt, each player most prefers mutual cooperation
but might defect in order to achieve a smaller payoff. A player's worst case
occurs when she keeps cooperating while her rival defects; consequently,
she would rather see both players defect than end up being the sucker
(cooperating while the rival defects). 73 In terms of its payoff structure, Stag
Hunt is surprisingly close to Harmony.' 74 Both games are symmetrical and
have mutual cooperation as the most preferred outcome. The preference
order in Stag Hunt is CC > DC > DD > CD and the corresponding
strategic form is depicted in Figure 6.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
173. The original story behind the game's name is about a group of people attempting to
catch a stag. One of the hunters suddenly has an opportunity to catch a rabbit, which would ensure
him a lower payoff but would undermine his fellows' efforts completely. The story traces back to Jean
Jacques Rousseau. See ORDESHOOK, supra note 48, at 209.
174. To see this point, consider first a slight transformation of the Harmony game in which
the two middle terms in the preference order are swapped: CC > DC > CD > DD (instead of CC
> CD > DC > DD). The outcome is still a Harmony game. Both players have a dominant strategy
to play C, and a Pareto-efficient outcome results. Now consider a further transformation in which the
two right-hand side terms are swapped. The preference order is now CC > DC > DD > CD
(instead of CC > DC > CD > DD), which yields the Stag Hunt game.
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Notwithstanding the similarity between the payoff structures of the two
games, Stag Hunt is dramatically different from the Harmony game. Stag
Hunt has two Nash equilibria: in CC and in DD. On its face, the game
should end in mutual cooperation, which is Pareto-efficient compared with
mutual defection and can be expected to be the focal point. However, if a
country suspected that its rival might defect, it would respond with
preemptive defection, and the game will end in DD. Such an outcome might
occur if a player fears that its rival plays with a "trembling hand," that is,
that the rival might make an irrational move for reasons beyond its control.
In the international context these moves could be domestic political pressures
or changes of government.'75 Ensuring the optimal outcome would be easier
if the players could provide assurances that they will cooperate. For this
reason the game is also dubbed the "Assurance Game. "176
The Stag Hunt scenario is hard to reconcile with the way we portrayed
fraud and states' attitudes toward it. After all, why should a state consider as
175. See Martin, supra note 52, at 781. Strictly speaking, "trembling hand" problems are not
possible in models without randomization of strategy choice. The simple 2x2 game presented here is
thus only the starting point of the discussion.
176. See STEIN, supra note 39, at 30; Martin, supra note 52, at 780. Stein sees the
international extradition of criminals as an example of such an assurance game. See STEIN, supra note
39, at 31. Some states, he argues, "require treaties to provide them with assurances that the other state
will behave in a predictable fashion when questions of extradition arise." Id. While I fully agree with
the argument, I believe it can be taken even further in light of the main text. Extradition treaties
usually include a condition of double criminality-that the alleged conduct is deemed criminal in both
states. This is exactly the point made in the text: states require assurances that they share the same
views and values with regard to a certain conduct before they cooperate in enforcing its prohibition.
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disastrous a situation in which it fights fraud? I intend that the "core" classic
fraud, as we understand it, is not the central reason behind the MOU
movement. To be sure, fighting "regular" fraud clearly benefits from the
existence of the growing MOU network '77 but query whether it could have
enabled its inception in the first place. Rather, other forms of conduct not
yet perceived by all nations as equivalently fraudulent are the stronger
reason. One such case may be outbound transnational fraud, discussed in
this Section. The following Section argues that, to a large extent, the MOU
movement was originally targeted against insider trading and used an
antifraud rhetoric as a vehicle toward that end.
C. Insider Trading Regulation
Insider trading is the last component of substantive securities regulation
that this Article discusses. Unlike fraud, one can find considerable diversity
in states' regulatory attitude toward insider trading; to see how states can
differ in this regard, let us begin with an example.
Before leaving Japan after World War II, the Allied Powers imposed a
complete set of securities laws. The Japanese Securities Exchange Law of
1948 ("the Law") was copied verbatim from the American Securities Act of
1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and rules thereunder. After its
enactment, only minor amendments to the Law were introduced, some of
which even tracked post-1948 developments in American laws. Specifically,
the Law included a version of Rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act, but it was not
applied to insider trading.'
Amendments to the Law, passed in 1988, prohibit insider trading in
general and in connection with tender offers in particular, purporting to
imitate the effect of Rules lOb-5 and 14e-3. Nevertheless, the insider trading
regime in Japan remained in a state of desuetude. Japanese stock markets
traditionally have been replete with insider trading and price manipulation
both before and after the 1988 amendments. In 1994, a newly established
Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission (SESC) started to bring
charges for insider trading, 79 but some considered it a camouflage for a
177. The main administrative benefit is the ability to exchange information, especially where
secrecy laws had previously blocked such exchange.
178. For overviews and analyses of Japan's securities laws, see Atsuko Hirose, Changes in
Japanese Securities Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 508 (1992); Wataru Horiguchi, Securities Malfeasance
in Japan: The Need for an Independent Organization to Monitor Insider Trading, Price Manipulation,
and Loss Compensation, 16 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. RPv. 223 (1993); Shen-Shin Lu, Are the
1988 Amendments to Japanese Securities Regulation Effective Deterrents to Insider Trading?, 1991
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 179; George F. Parker, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan:
Introducing a Private Right of Action, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1399 (1995); and Nicole J. Ramsay,
Japanese Securities Regulation: Problems of Enforcement, 60 FORDHAM L. REv. S255 (1992).
179. See Steven Brull, Japanese Panel Brings Insider Charges, INT'L HERALD TRIa., Oct.
15, 1994, at 19; Emiko Terazono, Tokyo Insider Dealing Probe Urged, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb.
11, 1995, at 3.
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nonenforcement policy.' 80 In early 1998, this observation still seemed
correct. 1 '
Japan's case is especially interesting in light of the similarity to the
United States of its statutory text, but it is not unique. Insider trading was
outlawed only recently in many European countries, sometimes reluctantly,
in compliance with an EU directive.' This Section sketches some
background necessary for understanding international diversity in insider
trading laws. It then offers a new outlook on insider trading, connected to
the previous discussion of fraud, and models possible international
interactions with regard to transnational insider trading.
1. Sources of International Diversity
Several factors may cause insider trading not to be treated in relative
international harmony as are other facets of fraud. Although intuitively
clear, the nature of the conduct in insider trading defies exact definition. For
example, defining the scope of liable persons requires a determination of
first-tier insiders (like officers and directors of the company), second-tier
insiders (tippees), and so on. States can diverge not only over imposing
liability on the second- and third-tier insiders, but also over the degree of
liability and sanctions. These differences, however, are secondary and
become relevant only after two states come to share the view that insider
trading is undesirable and should be condemned. As the preceding
paragraphs demonstrate, this is not yet the case in the international arena.
Even when states do outlaw insider trading, they do not necessarily pursue
violators with comparable vigor, and the consequence is de facto differences
among states.
Several factors cause insider trading not to be treated like regular
fraud. To be sure, powerful forces that determine states' attitudes toward
insider trading include cultural, traditional, and political factors. In many
180. See Rupert Bruce, U.S. and Britain Spur Asia Toward Reform, INT'L HERALD TRm.,
Oct. 1, 1994, at 19.
181. In the year ended June 30, 1997, the SESC filed a "record" five criminal complaints,
only three of which concerned insider trading. The previous record number of criminal complaints
filed by the watchdog was three, set in the year from July 1994 to June 1995. See Securities Watchdog
Filed 5 Criminal Complaints in Year, Japan Econ. Newswire, Oct. 1, 1997, available in LEXIS,
Busfin Library, Allnws File. It was only in July of 1997 that the first prison sentence was levied for
insider trading-and even that sentence was a suspended one. See Ex-lawyer Gets Suspended Term for
Insider Trading, Japan Econ. Newswire, July 28, 1997, available in LEXIS, Busfin Library, Allnws
File.
182. See Council Directive 89/592 of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on
Insider Dealing, 1989 O.J. (L 334) 330. See generally Lynda M. Ruiz, European Community
Directive on Insider Trading: A Model for Effective Enforcement of Prohibitions on Insider Trading in
International Securities Markets, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 217 (1995).
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states, including Japan and some promient European countries, insider
trading has been tolerated for a long time as "part of the game" of securities
trading and has not even carried a stigma of being immoral. Particularly in
Japan, insider trading continues to be an integral part of the interrelations
between politicians and the business community. I"3
Against this backdrop, the United States had stood alone in holding a
very hostile view toward insider trading."M Donald Langevoort plausibly
traces the roots of this difference in attitude to American "egalitarianism and
obsession with the appearance of fair play."185 Obviously, not all nations
share such values with the same intensity as the United States. In fact, even
Americans are not single-minded on this issue. Notwithstanding the
developments in American case law and public hostility toward insider
trading, academia in the United States still debates the adverse effects of
insider trading and whether it should be prohibited at all."86
In fact, even American securities laws did not outright condemn insider
trading for almost three decades after the enactment of the Securities Acts.'8
Specifically, Rule lOb-5"88-today the primary vehicle for public and private
enforcement-only generally outlaws fraud "in connection with the purchase
or sale of securities." Only in 1961 did the SEC apply Rule lOb-5 to insider
trading and announced the fundamental insider's duty to "abstain or
183. See Makoto Sato, Focus Returns to Lawmaker Stock Trading, NIKKEI WKLY., Mar. 2,
1998, at 4; see also Cox, Regulatory Competition, supra note 26, at 152; Lu, supra note 178, at 237
("[One] reason for the [Securities] Bureau 'inefficiency' is that bureaucrats and politicians may well
be involved in insider trading themselves.").
184. A colorful exposition of this view was provided by James Cox: "American
jurisprudence abhors insider trading with a fervor reserved for those who scoff at motherhood, apple
pie, and baseball." James D. Cox, Insider Trading and Contracting: A Critical Response to the
"Chicago School", 1986 DuKE L.J. 628, 628.
185. Langevoort, Fraud and Insider Trading, supra note 21, at 182 ("Under this view,
insiders should be content with their paychecks and not overreach for profits. That this smacks a bit of
populism, of envy and resentment directed at the privileges of class and wealth, is hard to deny. But
appeal to populism is a recurrent theme in American economic history.") (citations omitted); cf.
MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERs-THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN
CORPORATE FINANCE 28-32 (1994) (exploring the effects of political factors, including populism, on
American corporate finance).
186. The economic arguments and the corresponding legal ones are covered later in this
Article. For ethical arguments, see James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information: Copyright,
Spleens, Blackmail, and Insider Trading, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1413 (1992); Kim L. Scheppele, It's Just
Not Right: The Ethics of Insider Trading, 56 L. & CONTEMP. PROnS. 123 (1993).
187. Indirectly, insider trading has been severely restricted by section 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1994), which requires a limited category of "core" insiders to
report, monthly, changes in their holdings, and denies such insiders "short swing" profits-profits
made through sale-and-purchase or purchase-and-sale transactions within six months. For a review
and assessment, see ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 293-300 (1986); and Steve Thel, 7he
Genius of Section 16: Regulating the Management of Publicly Held Companies, 42 HASTINGS L.J.
393, 393 (1991) (suggesting that Section 16 is better understood as a tool for promoting the efficient
operation of publicly-held corporations). See also Jesse Fried, Towards Reducing the Profitability of
Corporate Insider Trading Through Pretrading Disclosure, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 303, 306 (1998)
(examining measures that could be adopted to reduce the ability of corporate insiders to profit from
inside information).
188. Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1998).
2x2 Games of International Securities Regulation
disclose."" 9 The rule was adopted by the Second Circuit in 1968,"'° and by
the Supreme Court only in 1980.'9'
Put plainly, insider trading in the United States was held to be "bad"
by stigmatizing it as "fraud" through the application of Rule lOb-5. While
equating insider trading with fraud is defensible, it is by no means a
necessary logical move. One should bear in mind that in 1961 the SEC was
facing a deficiency in the Securities Acts with regard to insider trading, and
using the powerful yet open-ended Rule lOb-5 was a natural step to take.
19
However, it was natural only in the American setting of certain public
views, a resourceful and powerful Commission, and great hurdles to passing
Congressional legislation. One may also speculate from the fact that the
opinion in Cady, Roberts was written by Chairman William Cary, a man
who had very clear views about the need for federal intervention in order to
set minimum standards for state corporate laws. 93 Had any or all of these
factors been different, the proscription of insider trading might have taken a
different form, not necessarily by declaring it to be "fraud."
2. Economic Analyses
Economic analysis of insider trading further supports the likelihood of
regulatory diversity over insider trading. Limits of scope do not allow a full
overview of economic arguments made with regard to the effects of insider
trading, but one can generally identify two strands of thought, one opposing
and one supporting insider trading regulation.194 In a nutshell, opponents of
insider trading regulation argue that allowing managers to engage in insider
trading may be an efficient compensation mechanism, although they would
disallow insider trading by secondary insiders. Since everybody is aware of
the possibility of insider trading taking place, appropriate discounts are made
in advance, so that nobody can claim to be harmed. 9
189. Re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961); see CLARK, supra note 187, at
320-21.
190. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 847 (2d Cir. 1968).
191. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 225 (1980).
192. Cf. Donald C. Langevoort, Rule 10b-5 as an Adaptive Organism, 61 FORDHAM L. REv.
S7, S7 (1993) (arguing that Rule lOb-5 is suited as a centerpiece of securities regulation because of its
flexibility).
193. See Cary, supra note 8, at 696-705.
194. For a convenient overview see DONALD C. LANGEVOORT, INSIDER TRADING
REGULATION 8-17 (1990).
195. See, e.g., MACEY, supra note 60, at 13-16; HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
STOCK MARKET 12-15 (1966); Dennis Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857, 866-72 (1983); Michael J. Carney, Signaling and Causation in
Insider Trading, 36 CATH. U. L. REv. 863, 867-75 (1987).
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Proponents of insider trading regulation point out two kinds of harm
caused by insider trading: harm to the company and harm to the market. The
alleged harm to the company stems from the well-known agency problem
that arises from the separation of ownership and control in the corporation.
Managers preferring their private interests over those of the company would
manage it suboptimally or exploit it to their benefit." '9 Individual and other
uninformed shareholders experience another type of harm from insider
trading because they cannot fully hedge against their informational
inferiority. 9 ' Adverse effects on the market are said to stem from the
precautions taken by non-insider traders to ward off the possibility of being
the "suckers" in a transaction. Such steps decrease market efficiency as a
price-discovery mechanism.'
Consider a hypothetical securities commission evaluating its insider
trading regulation policy. Economic arguments alone offer the commission a
variety of positions it may choose and still reasonably legitimize publicly.
196. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 187, § 8.2; Cox, supra note 184, at 628 (stating that
transparency of management compensation justifies insider trading regulation); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 S.
CT. REv. 309, 327 (noting that insider trading decreases incentives to disclose and produce
information); Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the
Large Corporation, 80 MicH. L. Rev. 1051, 1054-60 (1982) (noting that insider trading obstructs the
orderly flow of information in the firm); Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and
the Law of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REv. 117, 107-21 (1982); Michael Manove, The Harm from Insider
Trading and Informed Speculation, 104 Q.J. ECON. 823, 825-27 (1989) (discussing the adverse
effects on the company wrought by discouraging company investments).
A more balanced attitude is presented in a series of papers by Lucian A. Bebchuk and Chaim
Fershtman. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Chaim Fershtman, The Effect of Insider Trading on Insiders'
Efforts in Good and Bad Times, 9 EUR. J. POL. ECON. 469, 469-71 (1993); Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Chaim Fershtman, Insider Trading and the Managerial Choice Among Risky Investment Projects, 29
J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1, 156-62 (1994).
197. In a competitive market dealers tend to break even. Since insiders benefit from their
superior information, their profit must come at the expense of uninformed ("noise") traders who are
likely to be individual shareholders. See Ananth Madhavan, Consolidation, Fragmentation, and the
Disclosure of Trading Information, 8 REv. FIN. STUD. 579 (1995) (presenting a formal model).
In an international multi-market setting this harm could be exacerbated to the extent that
market fragmentation would facilitate evasion from detection. In order to avoid being detected, an
insider could effect the transaction in a foreign market or through a foreign broker-dealer, typically in
a country with "blocking laws" that provide for financial confidentiality. An insider who wanted to
trade an unusually large block of securities could theoretically split the transaction among several
markets. By doing so, she would be less likely to create detectable patterns, since the transaction in
each market is less significant and may get blurred by trading noise. See Licht, supra note 1, 598-99.
Respectively, in order to regain the capability to effectively detect insider trading, commissions
would have to interconnect their monitoring systems and databases. Cooperation in transnational
enforcement of insider trading laws turns out to be more necessary than in other areas of securities
regulation. At the same time, cooperation is also more demanding in terms of the resources needed for
effective regulation. See Mann et al., International Agreements, supra note 25, at 837-38 (describing
the role and prevalence of surveillance sharing agreements); Licht, supra note 168, at 37 (decribing
activities in the EU).
198. The chief effect is a higher spread-the difference between bid and ask prices. See
Walter Bagehot, The Only Game in Town, 2 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 2 (1971); Lawrence Glosten & Paul
Milgrom, Bid, Ask, and Transaction Prices in a Specialist Market with Heterogeneously Informed
Traders, 14 J. FIN. ECON. 71 (1985).
2x2 Games of International Securities Regulation
Having a policy tolerating insider trading may rely on "lack of scientific
consensus" or similar arguments. Obviously, the hypothetical commission
need not approve insider trading outright; rather, it may support a narrow
definition of the prohibited conduct and understaff its insider trading
enforcement teams.
Such a hypothetical commission, however, may also acknowledge the
harms caused by insider trading and yet decide to tolerate it, at least
partially, in order to maximize national welfare through other avenues by
externalizing its adverse effects. The point in such steps becomes clear when
we recall the agency problem and the regulatory competition, or the "race to
the bottom" phenomenon. Arbitrage trading in the internationalizing
securities markets allows countries to externalize the effects of their legal
securities regimes to other countries. 199 In the disclosure rules context,
offering a lenient disclosure regime could theoretically attract companies to
list their securities in that lenient market, thus drawing order flow and
additional economic activity to it."' In the insider trading context, an
additional element exists in the form of the agency problem. The actual
decision about which market (and legal regime) to choose is taken by the
company's agents, who may prefer their personal interests over that of the
company. Thus, managers may well opt for a lenient market, with a hope to
profit by engaging in insider trading, even at the price of decreasing the
company's value.2"'
At this point the hypothetical commission should determine what it sees
as the dominant adverse effect of insider trading-specifically, whether it
considers insider trading to be an offense against the corporation or against
the market. Considered as an offense against the market, the commission is
more likely to hold a hostile stance toward insider trading, since it adversely
affects a national resource. Thus, the victims of insider trading under this
philosophy are all the citizens of that country (and foreign participants),
irrespective of their being shareholders of the corporation whose securities
are traded by insiders. Conversely, if insider trading is treated as an offense
against the corporation, the adverse effects are limited to the corporation's
shareholders. For instance, where corporations listed in multiple markets are
involved, each state has only a partial interest in shareholder welfare,
determined by the relative holdings of its citizens in the corporation. In the
extreme, there may be no loss to local citizenry if the shareholder basis in
that country is nil-that is, when a corporation lists its securities in the
199. See Licht, supra note 1, at 631.
200. See supra Section V.A.
201. For a general theory of such significantly redistributive actions in the context of the
competition for corporate charters, see Bebchuk, supra note 8.
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country's market without making a public offering to its citizens and when
no substantial local holdings develop.
To recap, the general social attitude toward insider trading has not yet
reached a settled consensus-not in the United States, and clearly not in
other countries. This situation stands in stark contrast to the well-settled
attitude against regular fraud. Against this background, it is not surprising
that not all nations see eye to eye with the American policy-reasonable
regulatory minds can and do readily differ and conflicts among regulatory
regimes are inevitable. 2 Perceiving insider trading as an offense against the
corporation is likely to yield even greater diversity than perceiving it as an
offense against the market. Accordingly, we would expect more cooperation
to fight insider trading in the former case compared to the latter through
harmonizing laws and mutual assistance in enforcement.
3. The Correlated 2x2 Games and International Cooperation
The variety of possible national perceptions of and positions toward
insider trading leads to a variety of game models. The first two models in
this Subsection relate to symmetrical games-games in which both players
have the same preference order. The rest of the models brought here are
asymmetrical-where the players have different preference orders due to
different perceptions.
a. A Harmony Game
A straightforward case involves two countries with harmonious
interests, i.e., a game of Harmony. Each player-state derives its highest
utility from mutual cooperation, securing mutual assistance in monitoring
and detection of insider trading and in later pursuing violators and their ill-
gotten assets. The second-best option is unilateral enforcement of anti-
insider trading rules, including, for that purpose, asserting extraterritorial
jurisdiction. The third-best strategy is one in which the player-state itself
does not actively fight insider trading activities, say, for lack of resources,
but nonetheless benefits from enforcement actions taken by its counterpart if
the two markets are somehow interlinked.0 3 Finally, the least preferred
outcome is where neither party regulates insider trading. Formally, the
preference order is CC > CD > DC > DD, and the game's strategic form
is presented supra in Figure 5. The implication of such an interrelation
between the players for cooperation as discussed at length in Sub-subsection
IV.B.2.a.
202. See Langevoort, Fraud and Insider Trading, supra note 21, at 181.
203. Even if the two markets are completely separated, both players in the Harmony Game
scenario perceive insider trading as bad. Thus, they may prefer a situation in which at least one party
fights evil.
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b. Stag Hunt Game
Consider now an alternative scenario in which states' decision-makers
are not wholeheartedly determined to prohibit insider trading, for whatever
reason-political, ethical, or any other. Here it makes a big difference
whether a state's rival also prohibits insider trading (and effectively enforces
the prohibition). Each state would be willing to fight insider trading only on
condition that its rival also did so; otherwise, it would lose business to it.
Such fear is further exacerbated if the state is concerned with its ranking in
the international arena." 4
A state's best outcome, therefore, is mutual cooperation in enforcing
the prohibition. Next, it may prefer to be the renegade, for example, by
enacting anti-insider trading laws but declining to enforce them vigorously.
The third-best outcome would occur when neither player-state enforces anti-
insider trading rules. The most disastrous outcome will occur when a state
finds itself in the sucker's position, that is, when it fights insider trading
alone. What makes this scenario somewhat more plausible in the anti-insider
trading area than in the antifraud context is the lack of consensus with regard
to insider trading and the political and economic forces that work to keep it
available to people in positions of power. The players' preference order in
this game is CC > DC > DD > CD. This is the Stag Hunt game, and its
strategic form is presented supra in Figure 6.
In such a Stag Hunt game, states look for information and assurances
on their rival's true preferences and expected behavior. In principle, such
assurances should be willingly provided when both states share the same
interest in reaching the CC outcome. Although the fear from being the
sucker likens the situation to a Prisoners' Dilemma, the parties here do not
have to overcome a dominant strategy to defect. Respectively, there is little
need for central institutions with elaborate and resource-consuming
enforcement systems."5
If states could be assured that their progressive (hostile) stance against
insider trading will not be exploited by their competing rivals, they would be
more willing to enact and enforce anti-insider trading laws. Seen in this
light, the MOUs between the SEC and its fellow commissions abroad may
be best explained as optimal assurance mechanisms in a Stag Hunt game.
The same logic applies to the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act of
1988 (ITSFEA)2 6 and the International Securities Enforcement Cooperation
204. See supra Subsection 1UI.B.2.
205. See Martin, supra note 52, at 782.
206. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act, Pub. L. No.100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1994)).
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Act of 1990 (ISECA) °7. ITSFEA authorizes the SEC to conduct
investigations in the United States for foreign securities authorities. 8
Significantly, it does not require that the conduct subject to such
investigation be a violation of American laws.2 9 ISECA authorizes the SEC
to provide its information to foreign securities authorities for securities
investigations, and it further facilitates cooperation by exempting
information provided by foreign regulators from the Freedom of Information
Act.2 0 Both acts support and complement the MOU system because they
give the SEC more license in cooperating with fellow authorities. Thus, they
can be interpreted as a signaling mechanism-a unilateral assurance on
behalf of the United States that it is willing to pursue cooperative paths.21
c. Ideological Hegemony Games
The two game models presented so far were symmetric in assuming
similar preference orders for both players. The Harmony game assumes this
symmetry most strongly, and Stag Hunt takes into account the possibility of
deviation from this mutual interest. In light of the significant diversity in
states' attitudes toward insider trading, it seems necessary to analyze also the
asymmetric situation-that is, to assume different preference orders for the
player states. I call these games Ideological Hegemony games for reasons set
forth below.
Ideological Hegemony Game 1-Consider a game in which Row is
indifferent, for whatever reason, to insider trading, and Column sees great
value in banning it. In principle, Row is not willing to invest in enforcing
anti-insider trading rules, so its dominant strategy is D. While being
indifferent to insider trading per se, Row is fully aware of the economic
benefits that might accrue to it due to its attitude, so it prefers that Column
play C rather than D. Thus, its preference order is DC > DD > CC >
CD. Column's preferences are the opposite: it has a dominant strategy to
play C to effectively prohibit insider trading. Column's preference order is
similar to that in the Harmony game: CC > CD > DC > DD. Given the
two dominant strategies, a Nash equilibrium exists in DC, as depicted in
Figure 7.2
207. International Securities Enforcement Cooperation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-550 §
201, 104 Stat. 2713 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1994)).
208. See 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(2) (1994).
209. See id.
210. See 15 U.S.C. § 78x(d) (1994).
211. A typical MOU would call on the signatories to encourage the legislature in each
signatory's country to pass such authorizing laws.
212. Similar to the outcome in the pure Harmony game, swapping the two middle terms in
Column's preference order (which becomes CC > DC > CD > DD) does not change its dominant
strategy and the equilibrium outcome.
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Ideological Hegemony Game 2-Consider now a game in which
Column keeps playing the Harmony game as in Ideological Hegemony
Game 1. Row's attitude, however, is more cynical than in that game. While
it sees the importance of banning insider trading, it is willing to sacrifice
these values-provided that Column adheres to its anti-insider trading
policy-in order to prevail in the competitive international securities market.
Should Column change its policy and defect, Row will prefer to defect too.
In short, Row's preference order is that of the Prisoners' Dilemma-one that
characterizes a race to the bottom. Row's dominant strategy is to play D,
now for stronger reasons, and the equilibrium is again in (Row defect,
Column cooperate). Figure 8 sums the game in the strategic form.
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For a state in the position of Column, both asymmetric games
exemplify the Hegemon's Dilemma because one country's interests lead it to
a second-best outcome from its own point of view. Here, however, Column
need not be the kind of hegemon usually referred to by international
relations scholars-a world power. Rather, it ends up with an equilibrium
outcome for row and column of DC, respectively, due to its ethical values
that it considers superior and worth paying a price for.2"3 This is why the
situation may be called "ideological hegemony." The concept of hegemony
is disaggregated here into two components: structural hegemony-the
concentration of economic resources in a single state-and ideological
hegemony-the ability of the dominant state to persuade other actors to
accept its frame of reference as their own.
214
The implications for the form of international cooperation depend,
therefore, on Column's structural and ideological power in the international
arena. If Column is a powerful state, it may use side payments and threats to
change Row's payoff structure. Less dominant states or hegemons in decline
cannot exert equivalent leverage. They would probably prefer multilateral
fora that lend themselves to multilateral issue linkage or serve as face-saving
mechanisms. In the context of international securities regulation, the SEC
has indeed openly admitted that unilateral action on its part met with
considerable resistance and was largely ineffective-a fact that has caused it
to adopt a cooperative policy.
213. Cf. KEOHANE, supra note 118, at 74-75 ("Altruists and saints can be as rational as the
crassest materialist or most resolute bully.").
214. See Kenneth A. Rodman, Sanctions at Bay? Hegemonic Decline, Multinational
Corporations, and U.S. Economic Sanctions Since the Pipeline Case, 49 INT'L ORG. 105, 107 (1995).
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Now consider Row. For it, multilateral fora are more effective in
Ideological Hegemony Game 2, where the states need the multilateral
framework to overcome their dominant strategy to defect. Row states in
Ideological Hegemony Game 1, however, will show little interest in joining
a multilateral organization that, in their view, does not serve any valuable
goal. They would rather tolerate insider trading and garner the ensuing
benefits such that only coercion or enticement might change their behavior.
Indeed, many cases in which developed countries changed their laws to
proscribe insider trading were in response to heavy American pressures
initiated by the SEC.2"' In those cases a profound change in public
perception of insider trading was also required,216 which in turn necessitated
passing primary legislation. In any event, these pressures have severely
strained U.S. foreign relations and were another reason for adopting the
cooperative policy.21 Had the sole issue been providing assurances, MOUs
would have been sufficient.
We are now able to look again at IOSCO and its role in the MOU
movement. Tony Porter reports that IOSCO claims its 1989 Rio Declaration
to be "nothing short of the ancestor to almost all the Memoranda of
Understanding in place today,"2"' but rightly observes that several MOUs
were signed before the Rio Declaration, and that the United States
unilaterally initiated an overwhelming number of them. Within the analytical
framework suggested here, we can say that the United States has realized
that it cannot exert hegemonic power, in the traditional sense, to induce
countries to curb insider trading (and outbound fraud). Nevertheless, seeing
itself as an ideological hegemon, it utilized IOSCO to achieve the same
result. For all its members, IOSCO served the classic role assigned to a
weak organization like itself.219 First, by giving its imprimatur, it helped the
members save face. Second, by providing the text of a model MOU, it
strengthened the cooperational focal point.
215. See Kehoe, supra note 162, at 351-58.
216. See id.
217. See generally Mann et al., International Agreements, supra note 25 (discussing
jurisdictional issues arising between the SEC and internationalized U.S. securities markets).
218. PORTER, supra note 35, at 113.
219. Cf. Anne-Marie Burley, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and
the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND
PRAXIS OF AN INsTrrUTIONAL FORM, supra note 31, at 125 (arguing that postwar international
institutions that were initiated by the United States were inspired by its domestic New Deal regulatory
system).
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V. CONCLUSION
As the globalization of securities markets accelerates, international
cooperation in securities regulation grows in importance for regulators,
lawyers, and practitioners. The general setting is a competitive one-
competition is prevalent among markets and, consequently, among legal
regimes (regulatory competition). Various forms of connection, particularly
arbitrage trading in multiple-listed securities, now carry the effects of one
regulatory regime to its neighbors. The outcome is a composite legal system
in which national regimes may either enhance or erode the regulatory
objectives of the component regimes.2 The resulting external effects are
reminiscent of those encountered in environmental contexts: for example,
transborder emission of hazardous substances. In contrast, securities markets
do not require geographical proximity in order for states to affect one
another adversely. Also, in order to effectively enforce a country's securities
regulation regime domestically, regulators increasingly need cooperation
from their foreign counterparts. Cooperation among securities regulators is
thus warranted for reasons that are beyond the standard argument for
curbing a regulatory race for the bottom (which still retains its force, where
applicable). Regulatory cooperation today encompasses a variety of issues
and may take place in various political and economic settings.
This Article looked at problems of international cooperation in
securities regulation in a new way. The gist of the analysis was the
application of an interdisciplinary approach to these problems that integrates
insights gained by international relations theory into an economic analysis of
securities regulation. The Article examined three fundamental subjects of
securities regulation-disclosure, antifraud, and insider trading-and
transformed states' policies into preference orders in 2x2 games. Each of
these issue areas may be modeled by different types of games, denoting a
different conflictual structures among states' respective securities regulation
policies. Hence, different predictions can be made about the level of
expected international cooperation in that area. The Article then analyzed
some facets of current cooperation regimes in light of these structural
conclusions.
To the extent that disclosure regulation constitutes a regulatory burden,
the provision of disclosure rules (requiring issuers to disclose more) creates
a situation akin to a Prisoners' Dilemma, calling for a strong, centralized
regime to solve it. However, other aspects of this subject, such as the setting
of accounting rules, are less conflictual as captured by the Battle of the
Sexes game model. They call for weaker institutions that can achieve a great
deal merely through information exchange. Power differences between
nations add yet another factor in designing international disclosure regimes
(see Table 1).
220. See Licht, supra note 1, at 635-36.
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Antifraud and anti-insider trading regulation is also non-monolithic.
While fraud tends to be combated in relative unison, thus requiring little
investment in international institutions, insider trading and, to a lesser
extent, outbound transnational fraud are not treated similarly across the
globe. Reaching sustainable cooperation in these issues, however, is
primarily a matter of providing assurances-a situation that is well modeled
by the Stag Hunt game. Here, too, considerations of hegemony and power
may complicate the analysis but facilitate cooperation by establishing (or at
least initiating) a power-based regime. On the whole, anecdotal evidence,
especially from the SEC's efforts to establish international cooperation,
tends to support the theoretical predictions (see Table 1).
TABLE 1. SUMMARY
Subject Typical Games Regimes/ Institutions Examples
Disclosure- a Prisoners' Dilemma * Strong, centralized * EU
Substantive * Hegemonic Stability * Power based * MJDS
Disclosure- * Battle of Sexes * Weak- Information 0 IOSCO
Presentation exchange
Antifraud * Harmony a Very weak or absent 0 MOUs
e Stag Hunt e Weak-Assurances
Insider Trading • Stag Hunt • Weak-Assurances 0 MOUs
e Ideological Hegemony e Power based
Notwithstanding its relative simplicity, the 2x2 game framework as
employed here nicely captures the many differences evident between
possible regulatory policies when they interact with one another. The critical
step in the modeling process is the transformation of a regulatory policy into
a preference order. Although it is unlikely that any actual relationship among
regulators could be neatly pigeonholed into the boxes of a 2x2 matrix, it is
equally unlikely that a typical securities regulator would be able to specify
her international cooperation policy in considerably more detail than the
format used here. The fact that a certain subject may be modeled by more
than one 2x2 game does not diminish the model's explanatory power, but
rather indicates the complexity of the issue.
In addition to having offered some new insights with regard to the
specific fields discussed herein, this Article implies an agenda for further
research. First, the methodology employed here can and should be similarly
applied to other topics in international securities regulation. Such topics may
include broker-dealer regulation, regulation of manipulative practices,
clearing and settlement mechanisms, and stock exchange regulation.
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Moreover, the same line of reasoning could be extended to other fields of
law, such as taxation and antitrust, where international cooperation is
relevant.2"'
Second, a better understanding of the dynamics of international
securities regulation may still be achieved by relaxing some of the
simplifying assumptions of 2x2 games. One could expect improved results if
repeated game models were used. By allowing a "shadow of the future" to
emerge, such models may yield more cooperational equilibria than the one-
period model. Caution, however, is warranted in this respect for reasons
explored earlier in this Article.222
Another feature of securities regulation is its gradual nature. Certain
aspects are manifestly gradual, such as the frequency and timing of
disclosure; others, like the prohibition of insider trading, may seem more
dichotomous but in fact have some gradual character, such as in the
definition of "insiders." Allowing for gradual degrees of cooperation should
yield more subtle conclusions.223 Similar progress may be achieved by
employing n-person game models, and by analyzing the effects of
incomplete information and perceptions.2"
Finally, more progress can clearly be made by empirically studying the
forms of international cooperation in securities regulation. In addition to the
conventional comparative analysis of national laws, there is evidently room
for studying the mechanisms of international cooperation, and international
cooperation must be accompanied by a common understanding of its
problems. This is not to say that national diversity in securities regulation
regimes must be eliminated, but rather that its effects must be more fully
understood. 5
221. The international tax system is a good candidate for such an exercise. Indeed, the
network of MOUs in securities regulation is but a shadow of the vast network of bilateral tax treaties.
One may thus wonder, why is there a WTO for trade but not one for tax? I leave the question to
experts in international taxation. However, the present work suggests that even where taxation is
concerned, different international problems involve different types and degrees of conflict. For
example, allocating taxable income between taxing countries seems more contentious than prevention
of complete tax evasion by taxpayers, which decreases the tax base. Each problem may warrant a
different international regime.
222. See supra text accompanying note 69.
223. See Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners' Dilemma: Implications for
International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 923, 941 (1985).
224. See, e.g., STEIN, supra note 39, ch. 3 (demonstrating that "misperception can lead to
deviations from otherwise expected outcomes").
225. The phenomenon of a common international understanding in a certain field was dubbed
"epistemic communities" in the international relations context. It is not yet clear whether we can talk
about an emerging epistemic community with regard to securities regulation. Cf. Peter M. Haas,
Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination, 46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992)
(defining and discussing epistemic communities). See generally Jeffery Atik, Science and International
Regulatory Convergence, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 736, 758 (1996-97) (discussing the possibility
that science may provide "a new kind of international discourse" in certain regulatory contexts).
